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1SLAM, LAW AN\D CUSTOM:
Redefining Muslim Women's Rights
By Azizah al-Hibri*
INTRODUCTION"
Muslim women's rights have been the subject of a great deal of debate, most
recently in Beijing and Huairou.' While many secular feminists have criticized
* Research for this article was partially supported by a summer research grant from
the University of Richmond Law School, 1996. The article is partly based on a paper writ-
ten by this author for the Arab Regional Preparatory Meeting for the Fourth World Confer-
ence on Women, held in Amman, Jordan, September, 1995. The paper is entitled "Mashru'
Bahth Naqdi 1i Qawanin al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyah fi Buldan Arabiyah Mukhtarah," (Draft
Critique of Personal Status Codes in Select Muslim Countries), published by ESCWA,
United Nations (Doc. No. 94-054, Arabic, November, 1994), final version (Arabic and
English) forthcoming 1997. The paper was also presented at the ESCWA Expert Group
Meeting on the Arab Family in a Changing Society, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, De-
cember 10-14, 1994. This article is also partly based on an unpublished manuscript pre-
sented by the author at a seminar about the three Abrahamic religions entitled Teach a
Woman, Teach a Nation, held at Auburn Theological Seminary, New York, Winter, 1994.
The author thanks participants in the above meetings for their comments and help, particu-
larly, Dr. Farida Bennani, Professor of Law, University of Qadhi 'Iyadh, Marrakesh, Mo-
rocco, and Nabila Hamza, formerly of the Center of Arab Women for Training and Re-
search, Tunisia. The author also thanks Professor Adrien Wing, College of Law, University
of Iowa, Professor Gary Leedes, University of Richmond Law School, Drs. Fathi Osman
and Maher Hathout, Islamic Center of Southern California, and Dr. Taha al-Jaber al-
Alwani, School of Islamic and Social Sciences, Leesburg, Virginia, for their valuable com-
ments. Most of all the author acknowledges her debt to and deep appreciation of the late
Dr. Yorgy Hakim, Near Eastern and African Law Division, Library of Congress, for his
enthusiastic help and support. Last but not least, the author thanks Ms. Patricia Collins, her
student assistant. Without the diligent assistance of Ms. Collins, this article would not have
been completed on time.
** This article contains citations to Arabic Islamic sources which are not available in
English. For these sources, the American University Journal of International Law and Pol-
icy relied entirely on Professor al-Hibri's translation and interpretation.
1. Meetings of the UN Fourth Conference on Women and the NGO Forum, held in
Huairou, China, August, 1995. Some participants in the NGO Forum observed the rise of
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patriarchal religiously-justified laws in Muslim countries, many Muslim women
have defended Islam as the guarantor par excellence of women's rights. This
broad perceptual gap among women was partly explained by some as the result of
miscommunication. Secular feminists tend to blame Islam for laws in Muslim
countries which are oppressive to women. Muslim women tend to defend Islam in
light of their familiarity with the "ideals of Islam".3 In this article, I attempt to
close this communication gap by studying two types of problems that have been of
significant concern to Muslim women and others in the international community.
The first is that of the personal status codes in Muslim countries; the second is that
of the education of women. Personal status codes address matters of family law.
The reason for selecting these two problems for this article is that each problem
represents a different level of complexity in Islamic jurisprudence. This means
that different approaches may be adopted to resolve them. Yet, they are not juris-
prudentially or practically unrelated. Understanding this fact will help us in the
development of the best and fastest strategy for change in Muslim countries. It
provides us criteria for prioritizing certain demands in order to lay the proper
foundation for others.
In discussing personal status codes, the article focuses on three specific issues:
the right of a woman to contract her own marriage, the duty of the wife to obey her
husband, and the right of the wife to initiate divorce. There are several good rea-
sons for focusing on these issues. Foremost among them is the fact that they have
been and continue to be of great concern to Muslim women. Another reason is
that despite their diverse subject matter, these three issues are based on the same
jurisprudential foundation. Hence, our discussion and critical analysis of that
foundation will have similar implications for all three.
In discussing the three issues, I provide an internal critique of the jurisprudence
spirituality among women as indicated by the sharp rise in the number of sessions address-
ing matters relating to religion or
spirituality.
2. I would also add that faulty reasoning, in particular the fallacy of non-sequitur, is
often involved in arguments of some secular feminists. A defective law does not necessar-
ily imply that the premises from which it was derived suffer a similar defect. In fact, the
defect may be the result of a faulty derivation or even a misunderstanding of the proper
scope or significance of the premise. A later part of this article illustrates such problems of
derivation and interpretation.
3. Sisters In Islam, a Malaysian women's organization, issued a press release in Huai-
rou, August, 1995, stating that "two dominant and opposing views on Islam" emerged in
the NGO Forum at Huairou. The release characterizes the first view as focused on
"comparing the ideals of Islam with the reality and ills of the Western world". The second
view, it adds, "rejects religion as a reaction against Islamic conservatism and abuses com-
mitted in the name of Islam." Sisters in Islam rejects both positions and "advocates a re-
construction of Islamic principles, procedures and practices in light of the basic Qur'anic
principles of equality and justice." Dr. Laila AI-Marayati, a member of the official U.S.
delegation to the UN Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing, September,
1995, also issued a statement echoing similar views on Islam and the need for alternative
jurisprudential interpretations.
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that led to their adoption. In the process, I shed some light on the logic of Islamic
jurisprudence and its historical relation to existing personal status codes in Muslim
countries. Finally, I propose a Muslim feminist solution to the advancement of
women's rights in Muslim countries.
For reasons of space, this article focuses on the personal status codes of select
Muslim countries. These are Egypt, Algeria, MoroccoTunisia, Syria, Jordan and
Kuwait (collectively, their codes will be referred to as the "Codes"). For the same
reason, the scope of the discussion in Part H of this article is limited to Qur'anic
sources only. Ideally, a critique which also takes into account the hadith (the
words of the Prophet Muhammad) would be preferable. But that task shall remain
for another day. In any case, it is important to remember that, traditionally, a
hadith which appears to contradict a Qur'anic passage is usually viewed as based
on a false report or is reinterpreted in a fashion consistent with the Qur'an.
Incidentally, the Codes apply only to Muslims. Non-Muslims are subject to
their own religious laws. Therefore, the problems reflected in these Codes primar-
ily affect Muslim women. The problems experienced by non-Muslim women,
who live in these countries under their own religious personal status codes, will not
be addressed here.
THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNAL CRITIQUES.
It is important to keep in mind that most Muslim women tend to be highly
religious and would not want to act in contradiction to their faith. As an example,
I share the following experience. A couple of years ago, I met some "modem"
Muslim women behind closed doors in a certain Muslim country. The object was
to have frank discussions about Islam and the rights of women. The women re-
flected a high degree of conflict and frustration. They wanted to be good Muslims,
but they wanted to have their rights as well. When we focused on the issue of
greatest concern to them, the Qur'anic view of gender relations, and I provided a
non-patriarchal Qur'anic interpretation on the subject, sighs of relief filled the
room. The conflict created by patriarchal interpretations for Muslim women who
do not have the benefit of a religious education is frightening.
The majority of Muslim women who are attached to their religion will not be
liberated through the use of a secular approach imposed from the outside by inter-
national bodies or from above by undemocratic governments. The only way to
resolve the conflicts of these women and remove their fear of pursuing rich and
fruitful lives is to build a solid Muslim feminist jurisprudential basis which clearly
shows that Islam not only does not deprive them of their rights, but in fact de-
mands these rights for them.
The last statement is of course quite controversial and many knowledgeable
readers may be ready to recount the various counter-examples to the claim that Is-
lam provides a liberating worldview. Indeed, it has been "established" for quite a
while in the International community that Islam is oppressive to women. It is my
view that such a position is based either on mistaken belief or secular bias. In the
first case, the international community appears to have readily embraced the patri-
19971
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archal interpretations of Islam as authoritative. In the second case, individuals
may have reached their conclusions based on an apriori view of religion as such.
In either case, Muslim women have been quite suspicious and resentful of
Western feminist concern about "their plight." For one, they note, that Western
culture has not exactly improved the status of women. It created "super moms"
who are eternally exhausted and turned female sexuality into a commodity. For
another, they detect an Orientalist perspective which has its roots in colonialist pe-
riods when some occupiers, such as the French in Algeria, attempted to "liberate"
Muslim women by tearing their veils. In fact some of these "liberators" were more
anxious to "liberate" colonized women than their own compatriots. 4 The lessons
Muslim were quick to draw from such experiences is that the so-called liberators
were pursuing a well-studied policy to destabilize Muslim societies and tear apart
their familial structures. This view has received added support given the attitude
that Western governments have taken recently towards democracy in Muslim
countries. They advocate it, they praise it, but their deeds belie their words. They
lend unconditional support to regimes that consistently violate human rights, so
long as these regimes continue to protect Western economic and geopolitical inter-
ests.5
Given this sad state of affairs, it is imperative that Muslim women find their
own way in the thickets of patriarchal religious reasoning, just as Christian and
Jewish women have been doing. To deny them equal opportunity in this regard
would be nothing short of discriminatory. This position does not mean that West-
ern women, secular or religious, will have no role in the struggle for Muslim
women's rights. Rather, it means that their role will be supportive and thus secon-
dary to that of Muslim women, as it should be in this matter.
4. See RANA KABBANI, IMPERIAL FICTIONS (Pandor rev. and exp. ed., 1994); MARNIA
LAZREG, THE ELOQUENCE OF SILENCE, especially 136, 224 (Routledge ed., 1994).
5. For a critique of the international human rights movement and its use by the West
as a tool for spreading its hegemony see, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS: MYTH OR REALrrY - AN
ASSESSMENT OF WESTERN AND ISLAMIC VIEWS, (Islamic Political Programme Series Broad-
cast, London 1995). See also Richard Falk, Cultural Foundations for the International
Protection of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, 44-64,
especially 55 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1992) (stating
"[miost states, even when avowedly concerned about human rights, often lack capability
and credibility, having too much to hide themselves and generally subordinating their hu-
man rights concerns by according priority to geopolitics.").
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE
General Observations. Many aspects of the life of Muslims in Muslim coun-
tries, including their views on the education of women and their family laws, rest
in substantial part on medieval Islamic jurisprudence. Scholars based this juris-
prudence on two components: religious and cultural. The cultural component gave
rise to certain fundamental social and political assumptions. These assumptions
have become so deeply-rooted in Islamic jurisprudence that many Muslims are no
longer aware of their non-religious origins. The assumptions gave rise to a then
common model of state and family relationships which are best described today as
authoritarian/patriarchal. This model has not only been very detrimental to
women, but it has also caused serious damage to society as a whole.
It is worth noting that the rise of patriarchy in the Muslim world was not his-
torically an isolated event. Muslim Arab patriarchy was greatly influenced in its
development by the neighboring Byzantine and Persian empires. In fact, during
that period the whole world was in the firm grip of Patriarchy. It took women
endless centuries before they could even begin challenging it successfully.
As patriarchal forces tightened their grip on Muslim countries, they attempted
to reduce the status of women in society to that of inactive immature dependent
beings who are neither full-fledged citizens of the state nor are capable of being in
full control of their own destiny.6 When this status is compared to that of Muslim
women during the life of the Prophet, the contrast is shocking. Early Muslim
women were actively involved in every aspect of the life of the nascent Muslim
society. They included business women, poets, jurists, religious leaders and even
warriors.7 Yet, it is futile to attempt to establish the liberating influence of Islam on
women by pointing to these ancient historical examples alone. So much patriar-
chal jurisprudence and practice has developed in the interim, that we must also se-
riously examine these patriarchal developments.
One problem immediately presents itself at this point. To critically examine
patriarchal Islamic jurisprudence from within the tradition, a woman must be fa-
miliar with the logic of usul al-fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence and its basic principles
of reasoning). This requirement is difficult to satisfy because over the centuries
6. Azizah al-Hibri, A Study of Islamic Herstory: or How Did l/e Get Into This Mess
in Wo~EN Am ISLAm 207-19, especially 214-15 (Azizah al-Hibri ed., Pergamon Press
1982).
7. For a good book from a woman's perspective, see I ABD AL-HALIM ABu SHUQQAH,
TAHRm AL-MAR'AH FI 'ASR AL-RIsALAH (5 vols.) passim (Kuwait, Dar al-Qalam, 1990);
Om.R KAHALAH, A'LAMi AL-NISA' Fi 'ALAhAY AL-'ARAB WA AL-IsLw.i (5 vols.) passim
(Beirut, Mu'assasat al-Risalah, 1959); Abu Ja'far al-Tabari, Tarikh al-Tabari: Tarikh al-
Umam wa al-Muluk (6 vols.) passim (9th Century, reprint, Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-
'Ilmiyah, 1991).
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patriarchy has drastically reduced women's access to the arena of Islamic jurispru-
dence despite the women's early involvement and contribution to it. Conse-
quently, the demand for the education of women, particularly in the area of relig-
ious studies, is critical.
BASIC SOURCES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE
The Qur'an is the foundation of Islamic Law. The sunnah (the hadith and ex-
ample of the Prophet) is used as a secondary source for further clarification and
guidance. Where the Qur'an and sunnah leave a question unanswered or unre-
solved, Muslim scholars resort to itihad (the science of interpretation and rule
making). Under established principles of Utihad, if the Qur'an and sunnah are si-
lent on a matter, it is permissible (among other things) to resort to local custom, so
long as that custom is consistent with the Qur'an and sunnah. In the legal arena,
this meant that it was permissible to supplement religiously-based law with cus-
tomary law.8
As one may expect, scholars from different societies, and even from the same
society, disagreed in their Utihad. No doubt then that some of them were wrong at
times. But so long as the iftihad was based on (linguistic and religious) knowl-
edge, and was conducted piously and in good faith, then the mujtahids (those who
engage in itihad) did not have to fear retribution from God.9 In fact, in a famous
hadith, the Prophet stated that a mujtahid who erred in itihad would even be re-
warded by God, presumably for exerting the effort to reach the correct answer.' 0
Individual Muslims who were not mujtahids were free to select the school of juris-
prudence they found most convincing and follow its guidance." Islam guaranteed
for each individual the freedom of choice in such matters because ultimately, each
Muslim will have to account personally to God for that individual's own choices.
Early jurists viewed disagreements among them as a sign of God's mercy,' 2 be-
8. See, e.g., SUBHI MAHMASSANI, MUQADDIMA FI IHYA' 'ULUM AL-SHARI'AH 67-69
(Beirut, Dar al-'Ilm Ii al-Malayin, 1962); see also MOHAMMAD SHALABI, UsUL AL-FIQH AL-
IsLAMI 325-28 (Beirut, al-Dar al-Jami'iyah, n.d.).
9. 2 WiHBAH AL-ZUHAYLI, UsUi. AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI (2 vols.) 1043-51,1066,1092-93
(Damascus, Dar al-Fikr, 1986); see also MARMASSANI, supra note 8, at 30; ABDEL QADER
ABU AL-'ILA, BunuTH Fi AL-IJTItAD 71-75 (Egypt, Matba'at al-Amanah,1987) (discussing
conditions of itihad).
10. ABU ABDALLAH AL-BUKHARI, 4 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI Bi HASHIAT AL-SINDI (4 vols.)
268 (9th Century, reprint, Beirut, Dar al-Ma'rifah, n.d.); 12 ABU AL-HUSsIN MUSLIM,
SAH- MUSLIM BI SHARH AL-NAWAWI (18 vols.) 13-14 (9th Century, reprint, Beirut, Dar
Ihya' al-Turath al-'Arabi, n.d.) (includes commentaries in the margin by the al-Nawawi, a
well-known 13th Century jurist); 2 AL-ZUHAYLI, supra note 9, at 1039; MAHMASSANI, supra
note 8, at 30.
II. For more on this point and the deterioration of the Muslim citizen's right to freely
choose a religious school of thought, see text accompanying notes 20-23.
12. ABI ABDULLAH MUHAMMAD BIN ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-SHAF'I, RAHMAT AL-UMMAH
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cause these disagreements injected Islamic laws with the degree of flexibility nec-
essary for a religion which proclaimed itself suitable for all times, all people and
all societies. 3 Thus, hundreds of schools of Utihad developed, each best suited to
its own community and that community's culture, with its attendant customs and
traditions. 14 Since all these ancient communities espoused patriarchal values of
one form or another, itihad was itself often unwittingly affected by, and hence re-
flected, these values. Furthermore, since these later communities (unlike the
Prophet) did not approve of the participation of women in public life, Utihad be-
came increasingly the male's preserve. In the end, Utihad, and in fact the judiciary
as a whole, became predominantly the domain of men. Thus, the woman's voice
was ultimately reduced to a whisper in this arena.
At the same time, authoritarian/patriarchal political authorities were dissatisfied
with the freedom of ijtihad practiced by scholars, even though that freedom was
accessible primarily to males. For obvious reasons, these authorities preferred that
'tihad serve their own narrow political interests, especially on such critical issues
as Islamic constitutionalism. Consequently, they made the life of dissident mzujta-
hids, and there were many, difficult. Many famous mujtahids, such as Imam
Malik Ibn Anas, suffered indignities at the hands of political authorities, and at
times even torture, for exercising their right of free thought and speech on politi-
cally significant matters.' 5 Given this political atmosphere and the fact that
women had been gradually removed from public and jurisprudential life, women
were in no position in those days to wage a successful fight for their rights.
For a number of reasons, very few major schools of thought remain viable to-
day. These include the Hanafi, Maliki (established by Imam Malik referred to
above), Shafi'i, Hanbali and Ja'fari schools. Almost all Muslim countries have
formally adopted the Utihad of one of these schools as the primary basis of their
family laws. Syria, Egypt and Jordan have adopted the Hanafi school ofjurispru-
dence, while Morocco, Algeria and Kuwait have adopted the Maliki school.
Therefore, these two schools will be the focus of this paper. Tunisia has resorted
in the formulation of its code to the doctrine of Takhayur (selection) which will be
discussed below.
Basic Principles. The five schools of thought mentioned above generally agree
that Islamic laws (1) change with the passage of time and with the change of place
i IrmrnAF AL-A'niMAH passim (14th Century, reprint, Beirut, Mu'assasat al-Risalah,
1994)(discussing this thesis in detail and including a bibliography on the subject).
13. I discuss the significance of this approach to the development of Islamic jurispru-
dence in Azizah al-Hibri, Islamic Constitutionalism and the Concept of Democracy, 24
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1 (1992). See also WmAmASSAmN, supra note 8, at 67-69; 2 AL-
ZUHAYL, supra note 9, at 1116-18.
14. MAHmAssAN, supra note 8, at 67-69; see also I An! HAMID AL-GHAZAI, %Wt'A"
'ULum AI.-DrN (4 vols.) 33 (1 1th Century, reprint, Egypt, Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi Press,
1939) (discussing the tolerant nature of early mujtahids toward disagreements among them).
15. 1 AL-GHAZALI, supra note 14, at 33, 34, 48; see also MNAmASSAKn supra note 8, at
20 (noting that, at one point, even jurists discouraged Utihad for fear of persecution). It
must be noted that some rulers encouraged certain schools of thought.
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or circumstance; 16 (2) must avoid harm; 17 (3) may be discarded if they are based
on a cause ('lilah) which itself has disappeared,' 8 and (4) must serve the com-
monweal ("public maslaha").19 Unfortunately, however, in applying these princi-
ples the all-male judges tended to define such notions as "harm" and
"commonweal", and analyze concepts such as 'illah and circumstantiality, in
terms which not only reflected a purely male perspective but often the perspective
of the political authorities as well.
It is important to note certain differences between the role of traditional juris-
prudence and that of the modem Codes. As mentioned earlier, originally, indi-
viduals were free to select and follow the school of itihad they preferred. They
could even combine it with preferred parts of the jurisprudence of other schools.
As the State grew more powerful, such choices were increasingly taken out of the
hands of individuals. Ultimately, the State took choice away from Muslim citizens
altogether in many areas of the law by selecting the jurisprudence of one of the
schools as the law of the land.2°
The selection by the State of a major school of thought denied individual Mus-
lims the ability to practice Islam according to their own understanding and convic-
tions in certain matters where the official state position differed from theirs.21
While such selection was contemplated by an Islamic state as early as the eighth
century, it was not successfully implemented until the sixteenth century by Sultan
Salim I, of the Ottoman empire.22 Actual codification of the law, however, did not
16. 2 AL-ZUHAYLI, supra note 9, at 1116-18. See also SUBHI MAHMASSANI, AL-AWDA'
AL-TAsHu'YA1 FI AL-DUWAL AL-ARABiYAH 478-79 (Beirut, Dar al-'llm 1i al-Malayin, 3rd
ed. 1965); Yusut HAmnD AL-'ALim, AL-MAKAssiD AL-'AMMAH 44-45 (Herndon, Virginia,
International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1991) (quoting Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah on the
limits of this principle). A derivative principle permits a change in the law whenever re-
lated customs change.
17. AL-'ALim, supra note 16, at 89.; MAHMASSANI, supra note 16, at 480. A related
principle is that of choosing the lesser of two evils.
18. AL-'ALM, supra note 16, at 123-25; see also MAHMAssANI, supra note 16, at 479.
A story about Khalifah Omar is often mentioned in connection with this principle. In that
story, the Khalifah stopped giving a certain group of people their share of sadaqah (alms),
despite a clear Qur'anic injunction to do so because, he reasoned, the 'Illah or cause under-
lying that injunction had disappeared. Many jurists have followed in Khalifah Omar's
footsteps.
19. MAHMASSAmI, supra note 16, at 480; see also AL-'ALIM, supra note 16, at 124-25; 2
AL-ZUHAYLI, supra note 9, at 1017-29.
20. A good discussion of the various historical stages that led to codification and the
implications of each of these stages as to the individual religious liberties of the Muslim
citizen and the freedom of itihad in society, can be found in MAHMASSANI, supra note 16,
at 157-60; 170-202.
21. TAWFIQ AL-SHAWl, FIQH AL-SHURA 268-70 (al-Mansurah, Egypt, Dar al-Wafa',
1992); see also MAHMASSANi, supra note 8, at 30 (stating that Imam Malik prohibited
Khalifa Abu Ja'far al-Mansour and Khalifa al-Rashid from ordering their people to follow
the Maliki school of thought).
22. MAHMASSANI, supra note 16, at 176-81.
[VOL. 12:1
ISLAM, LA WAND CUSTOM
take place until the nineteenth century (the turn of this century, in the case of the
personal status code) when the Ottoman Empire came increasingly under Western
influences.3
One of the later stages in the codification process adopted the doctrine of tak-
hayur. 4 This is a good doctrine which was unfortunately put to extensive patriar-
chal use in modem times by jurists charged with codifying Muslim family law.
According to this doctrine, in drafting a Code for a certain country that adhered to
the views of a major school of jurisprudence, a jurist is permitted to abandon the
jurisprudence of that school on a particular matter and adopt a competing point of
view offered by another major school, if he deemed the latter point of view supe-
rior for one reason or another. This approach is acceptable in light of the tradition
of freedom of yitihad, the Prophet's advice to Muslims to choose the easiest legiti-
mate solution,2 and the readiness of traditional jurisprudence to adapt to cultural,
temporal and other circumstantial factors, so long as that adaptation does not con-
flict with the Qur'an. Additionally, where the Code is silent on a matter of family
law, it is supplemented by the jurisprudence of the school to which the country of-
ficially adheres. I will name this latter rule the "doctrine of incorporation". As a
result of the operation of this doctrine, the Codes tend to be incomplete. For ex-
ample, a code may refer to a wali (guardian) without having ever properly intro-26
duced that term. The most notable example of the utilization of this doctrine is
the Egyptian Code itself which is quite fragmentary. It has no provisions govern-
ing marriage, and concentrates on such issues as maintenance and divorce.
The doctrine of takhayur was used and continues to be used to this day to inject
into Codes some of the most patriarchal contributions to Islamic jurisprudence.
Even the proposed Uniform Personal Status Code, which is being considered for
adoption by various Arab countries as a further step towards modernization, con-
tinues this unfortunate trend.
28
We now turn to a study of the two problems selected by this article.
23. Id at 192-205.
24. Id at 179.
25. 1 AL-BUKHAji, supra note 10, at 24; MAHmASSANI, supra note 16, at 479 (using a
Qur'anic verse, hadith and other material to support the thesis that a Muslim is permitted to
do even the prohibited out of necessity).
26. See, e.g., Decree No. 59 (1953) regarding Personal Status Law, amended by Law
No. 34 (1975), Bk. 1, Tit. 2, Chs. 3, 4 [hereinafter Syrian Code]; Family Law No. 84-11
(1984), Bk. 1, Tit. 1, Ch. 1, Arts. 9, 11 [hereinafter Algerian Code]. The most fragmentary
code is the Egyptian code which addresses very few matters, such as maintenance and di-
vorce, leaving most other matters to be dealt with according to the incorporated school of
thought.
27. Act No. 25 (1920) in respect of Maintenance and Some Questions of Personal
Status, and Act No. 25 (1929) regarding certain Personal Status Provisions, as both are
amended by Act No. 100 (1985) [collectively, hereinafter Egyptian Code].
28. See Ahmad al-Khamlishi, al-Tajdid Am al-Taghiallub 'Ala 'Akabact al-Tariq, in
JADmi AL-FaR AL-IsLai 79, 99-100 (Saudi Arabia, Mu'assassat al-Malik Abdul Aziz Al
Saud, 1989).
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II. MUSLIM WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND PERSONAL STATUS CODES
The three major issues we focus upon in the Codes are (1) the right of a woman
to contract her own marriage; (2) the duty of the wife to obey her husband and (3)
the right of the wife to initiate a divorce.
1. The Right of a Woman to Contract Her Own Marriage.
The general rule for six of the seven countries enumerated earlier(Tunisia being
the exception), and for many other Muslim countries, is that women do not have
the right to contract their own marriage.29 In these countries, a Muslim woman
needs a wali (guardian) to contract the marriage on her behalf.3° The wali is usu-
ally the father. This requirement is somewhat similar to the Western traditional
approach under which the father "gives away" the bride, but in this case it is a le-
gal requirement.
There are, however, significant exceptions to this general rule. The Moroccan
Code makes an exception for the adult mature woman who is fatherless. 3 1 The
Syrian Code permits a pubescent woman who is over 17 years old to request a
judge to perform the marriage.32 Before the judge can do so, however, he must ask
the wali (who is usually the father) for his opinion. In the absence of a non-
frivolous objection from the wali, the judge may proceed with the marriage so long33
as the prospective husband is eligible. This last condition is very important. If
the husband is ineligible, the wali has the right to demand judicial annulment, un-
29. Royal Decree No. 343.57.1 (1957), as amended by Royal Decree No. 347.93.1,
1993, Bk. 1, Tit. 3, Ch. 12, Art. 2 [hereinafter Moroccan Code]. Algerian Code, supra note
26, at Bk. 1, Tit. I, Ch 1, Arts. 9, 11. The Egyptian Code contains this provision indirectly
as a result of the "doctrine of incorporation" mentioned earlier. See Article No. 280, Act
No. 78 (Egypt, 1931). Syrian Code, supra note 26, at Bk. 1, Tit. 2, Ch. 3, Arts. 21-24.
Personal Status Code, Provisional Law No. 61 (1976), Ch. 1, Art. 6, and Ch. 2, Arts. 9-13
[hereinafter Jordanian Code]. Personal Status Code Decree, dated 13 August, 1956, as
amended 1993, Bk. 1, Art. 6 [hereinafter Tunisian Code] (specific provision applies only to
minors; Tit. 9 allows adults to marry without a wal). Law No. 51 (1984) Regarding Per-
sonal Status, Part 1, Bk. 1, Tit. 2, Ch. 2, Arts. 29-30 [hereinafter Kuwaiti Code],
30. Royal Decree No. 343.57.1 (1957), as amended by Royal Decree No. 347.93.1,
1993, Bk. I, Tit. 3, Ch. 12, Art. 2. Algerian Code, supra note 26, at Bk. 1, Tit. 1, Ch 1,
Arts. 9, 11. The Egyptian Code contains this provision indirectly as a result of the
"doctrine of incorporation" mentioned earlier. See Article No. 280, Act No. 78 (Egypt,
1931). Syrian Code, supra note 26, at Bk. I, Tit. 2, Ch. 3, Arts. 21-24. Personal Status
Code, Provisional Law No. 61 (1976), Ch. 1, Art. 6, and Ch. 2, Arts. 9-13. Personal Status
Code Decree, dated 13 August, 1956, as amended 1993, Bk. I, Art, 6 (specific provision
applies only to minors; Tit. 9 allows adults to marry without a wall). Law No. 51 (1984)
Regarding Personal Status, Part 1, Bk. 1, Tit. 2, Ch. 2, Arts. 29-30.
3 1. Moroccan Code, supra note 29, Bk. 1, Tit. 1, Ch. 12, Art. 4.
32. Syrian Code, supra note 26, Bk. 1, Tit. 1, Ch. 2, Art. 20.
33. Id.
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less the wife has conceived?34
The Jordanian Code permits a previously married woman who is rational and
over 18 years old to contract her own marriage. 5 Presumably, this means that the
Jordanian Code continues to require a wali for the rational adult bikar (previously
unmarried woman).36
The Kuwaiti Code permits a previously married woman or one who has reached
the age of 25 to make her own decision about marriage, without reference to the
views of her walL. But the law continues to require that the wali execute the
marriage contract on her behalf.
38
The Algerian Code goes furthest in underlining the importance of this require-
ment. In that jurisdiction, the wali can prohibit his bikr daughter from entering
into a marriage, if he deems the prohibition in her interest.39
It is worth noting that after the recent amendment to the Moroccan Code, it has
become the rule in all the named jurisdictions that no woman, particularly a bil,
may be forced into marriage against her will. 0 All these Codes have provisions
providing the woman with a judicial venue in case the wall unfairly blocks her
marriage. 
4
2. The Duty of the Wife to Obey Her Husband.
Until a few years ago, all Codes listed or implied a duty of obedience (ta'ah) by
the wife.42 The present Tunisian Code no longer requires obedience, although it
continues to describe the husband as the "head of the family".4 3
34. Id. art. 27-30.
35. Jordanian Code, supra note 29, Ch. 2, Art. 13.
36. This is implied by the remaining requirements of the Jordanian Code, Ch. 2, Arts.
9-14.
37. Kuwaiti Code, supra note 29, Pt. I, Bk. 1, Tit. 2, Arts. 8, 29,30.
38. Id
39. Algerian Code, supra note 26, Bk. 1, Tit. 1, Ch. 1, Art. 12.
40. Moroccan Code, supra note 29, Bk. 1, Tit. 2, Ch. 5, Art. I.
41. Algerian Code, supra note 26, Bk. 1, Tit. 1, Ch. 1, Art. 12; Jordanian Code, supra
note 29, Ch. 1, Art. 6; Kuwaiti Code, supra note 29, Pt. 1, Bk. 1, Tit. 3, Ch. 2, Art. 31; Mo-
roccan Code, supra note 29, Bk. 1, Tit. 3, Ch. 13; Syrian Code, supra note 26, Bk. 1, Tit. 2,
Ch. 2, Art. 20. Tunisian Code, supra note 29, Bk. 1, Art. 6 (applying to minors only).
42. Moroccan Code, supra note 29, Bk. 1, Tit. 6, Ch. 36, Art. 2; Algerian Code, supra
note 26, Bk. 1, Tit. 1, Ch. 4, Art. 39; Egyptian Code, supra note 27, Law, No. 25 (1929)
(amended 1985), Ch. 2, Art. 11 Repeated Twice; Jordanian Code, supra note 29, Ch 7, Art.
39; Kuwaiti Law, Pt. 1, Bk. 1, Tit. 5, Ch 3, Arts. 84-91; Syrian Code, supra note 26, Bk. 1,
Tit. 4, Ch. 3, Art. 75, by implication and generally as a result of the doctrine of incorpora-
tion. Tunisian Code, supra note 29, Bk. 1, Old Art. 23 (superseded). Some of these provi-
sions only partially address the ta'ah requirement simply because the Codes make use of
the doctrine of incorporation.
43. Tunisian Code, supra note 29, Bk 1, Art. 23 (amended 1993).
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The duty of ta'ah is very important because it includes the duty not to leave the
home without the husband's permission, and because violating the duty of ta'ah
(nushuz) has financial repercussions. All Codes (other than the Tunisian Code)
expressly recognize customary limits for ta'ah. For example, the wife may leave
the home without her husband's consent for a "legitimate reason" (as such term is
defined in Islamic law) such as visiting her family. 44 But the number of such
permissible visits is limited by some Codes to what is customary.45 More recently,
some Codes have permitted the wife to leave her home for legitimate (moral, un-
objectionable) work.4 6 The Jordanian Code specifies domestic violence and mal-
treatment as legitimate causes for leaving the home.47 The Kuwaiti Code regards
the wife's departure from the marital home justifiable (and hence not nushuz) if the
husband is not "trustworthy".48
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Kuwaiti Code quotes the Qur'an in argu-
ing that a marriage union is intended to bring two souls together in tranquillity, af-
fection and mercy.49 It explicitly rejects the view which defines the wife as the
"object of sexual enjoyment". 50 The section on ta'ah in the Kuwaiti Code is rela-
tively short and contains many provisions protecting women.
Also, under the Kuwaiti Code, if the wife refuses unjustifiably to move in with
her husband, then the court may order her to do so. 5 1 If the woman refuses to obey
the court order, she becomes nashiz (disobedient).5 2 The Kuwaiti court order can-
not be used to force the woman to move to her husband's home (as used to be the
44. Algerian Code, supra note 26, Bk. 1, Tit. 1, Ch. 4, Art. 38; Egyptian Code, supra
note 27, Law No. 25 (1920) (amended 1985) Bk. 1, Pt. 1, Art. I; Jordanian Code, supra
note 29, Ch. 9, Art. 69; Kuwaiti Code, supra note 29, Pt. 1, Bk. 1, Tit. 3, Art. 89 (see also
comments on this provision in the related Explanatory Memorandum); Moroccan Code,
supra note 29, Bk. I, Tit. 6, Ch. 35; Syrian Code, supra note 26, Bk. 1, Tit. 4, Ch. 3, Art.
75. The Kuwaiti, Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian provisions derive their full impact from
their use of the doctrine of incorporation or reference to customary law.
45. See, e.g., Algerian Code, supra note 26, Bk. 1, Tit. 1, Ch. 4, Art. 38; Moroccan
Code, supra note 29, Bk. I, Tit. 6, Ch. 35.
46. See, e.g., Egyptian Code, supra note 27, Law No. 25 (1920) (amended 1985), Bk.
1, Ch. 1, Art. 1; Kuwaiti Code, supra note 29, Part 1, Bk. 1, Tit. 3, Art 89. Cf. Syrian Code,
supra note 26, Bk. 1, Tit. 4, Ch. 73 (amended 1975); Jordanian Code, supra note 29, Ch. 9,
Art. 68.
47. Jordanian Code, supra note 29, Ch. 9, Art. 69.
48. Kuwaiti Code, supra note 29, Pt. 1, Bk. 1, Tit. 3, Art. 87, cl. 3.
49. Explanatory Memorandum to Draft Personal Status Code, comment on Pt. 1, Bk. 1,
Tit. 1, Art. 1. See also the Explanatory Memorandum, relating to Egyptian Act No. 100
(1985) which contains similar language. Moroccan Code, Bk. 1, Tit. 1, Ch. 1, is more ex-
plicit than either the Kuwaiti or Egyptian Code in describing the relationship between the
spouses as one characterized by "peace, affection, and respect," but the rest of the code
makes it clear that this relationship is also very hierarchical.
50. Explanatory Memorandum to Draft Personal Status Code, comment on Pt. 1, Bk. 1,
Tit. 1, Art. 1.
51. Kuwaiti Code, supra note 29, Pt. 1, Bk. 1, Tit. 3, Art. 87.
52. Id.
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case in Egypt). It can only be used as the basis for forfeiture of the wife's main-
tenance by the husband. 4
Most Codes permit the husband to cease his maintenance of a nashix wife.55
The Moroccan Code, however, does not permit such cessation, unless the wife has
violated a court order requiring her to return home to her husband's house and bed,
and unless ajudge decides to penalize the wife for the violation.55
3. The Right of the Wife to Initiate Divorce.
The general rule is that the primary right of divorce resides in the husband.57
Unless that right is delegated to the wife in one form or another, the wife must
seek either khul' (a form of divorce or annulment which will be discussed below)
or judicial annulment, separation or divorce. Justifications for granting the wife
judicial divorce include the presence of defects in the husband, insanity, harm,53
prolonged absence, sexual abandonment, cessation of maintenance and imprison-
ment of the husband.5 9
The Tunisian Code is the exception to this rule. It authorizes divorce requested
by mutual agreement. 6  It also authorizes judicial divorces, upon the request of
either party.6 1
The Algerian Code permits the judge to decree divorce if either party exhibits
53. IL arts. 87, 88.
54. Id
55. Algerian Code, supra note 26, Bk. 1, Tit.. 1, Ch. 4, Art. 37; Egyptian Code, supra
note 27, Art. 1; Jordanian Code, supra note 29, Ch. 9, Art. 68-69; Kuwaiti Code, supra note
29, Pt. 1, Bk. 1, Tit. 5, Art. 87; Syrian Code, supra note 26, Bk. 1, Tit. 3, Art. 74.
56. Moroccan Code, supra note 29, Bk. 3, Tit. 5, Ch. 123.
57. Algerian Code, supra note 26, Bk. 1, Tit. 2, Ch. 1, Art. 48; Egyptian Code, Law
No. 25 (1929) (amended 1985), by virtue of its adoption of the doctrine of incorporation,
Art. 1; Jordanian Code, supra note 29, Ch. 10, Art. 83; Kuwaiti Code, supra note 29, Pt. 1,
Bk. 2, Tit. 1, Art. 97; Moroccan Code, supra note 29, Bk. 2, Tit. 1, Ch. 44; Syrian Code,
supra note 26, Bk. 2, Tit. 1, Ch. 85, 87, Art. 2. For the Tunisian Code approach, see infra
note 60.
58. Certain Codes explicitly specify that verbal abuse is grounds for granting the wife
judicial divorce. See Jordanian Code, supra note 29, Ch. 10, Art. 132; Kuwaiti Code, supra
note 29, Pt. 1, Bk. 2, Tit. 3, Art. 126. The Moroccan Code speaks of "harm of any kind,"
Moroccan Code, supra note 29, Bk 2, Tit. 1, Ch. 56, Art. 1.
59. Algerian Code, supra note 26, Bk. 1, Tit. 2, Ch. 1, Art. 53; Moroccan Code, supra
note 29, Bk. 2, Tit. 1, Ch. 53-58; Syrian Code, supra note 26, Bk. 2, Tit. 1, Art. 105-12;
Jordanian Code, supra note 29, Ch. 10, Arts. 113-34; Egyptian Code, supra note 27, Law
No. 25 (1929) (amended 1985), Arts. 2 and 3; Kuwaiti Code, supra note 29, Pt. 1, Bk. 2,
Tit. 3, Arts. 120-42.
60. Tunisian Code, supra note 29, Bk. 2, Art. 31, cl. 1, but cI. 3 suggests that it is still
easier for the husband to seek divorce.
61. Id
1997]
AM U. J INT'L L. & POL'Y
nushUz. 62 (The notion of nushuz when applied to men has a different meaning. 63)
As stated earlier, all these Codes are based on the jurisprudence adopted by the
country of the respective Code, or adopted on the basis of the doctrine of takhayur.
Thus, in search of a better understanding of the above laws, we turn to their juris-
prudential underpinnings.
THE MALIKI AND HANAFI IJTIHAD ON THE THREE ISSUES
Because of the particular Codes being examined in this article, we select the
Hanafi and Maliki schools of thought for study. It is worth noting that in referring
below to the "Hanafi view" or the "Maliki view" we are simplifying the jurispru-
dence of these school tremendously. Each school consists of the thought of many
scholars who followed in the footsteps of the one after whom the school was
named and who may have ultimately differed with him or other followers on cer-
tain matters. Nevertheless, it is acceptable in each case to identify the school with
the predominant line of thought within it.
This too must be said; it would be ludicrous to suggest that the mounds of
painstakingly careful jurisprudence developed across the ages by such jurispru-
dence giants as Abu Hanifah and Malik Ibn Anas can be properly evaluated or
even addressed in this article. There is no doubt that these scholars did not only
have vast knowledge of their subject matter, but also great minds and piety. To
describe them as patriarchal jurists is, therefore, not to detract from their achieve-
ments. Rather, it is to suggest that despite their indisputable genius, these scholars
were nevertheless the products of their times. As they themselves recognized,
laws change with changes in time, place and custom. We are no longer living in
their times and some of what worked for their societies no longer works for ours.
1. The Woman's Right to Contract Her Own Marriage
The basic requirement which affects all jurisprudence on this matter is that of
the wali. Traditional Muslim jurisprudence and the above-mentioned Codes gen-
erally concur in requiring a wali for a bikr if she had not reached maturity!" Her
62. Algerian Code, supra note 26, Bk. 1, Tit. 2, Ch. 1, Art. 55.
63. The notion of nushuz when applied to men has a narrower meaning, since men have
no legal duty to obey women. The core meaning of the notion of nushuz, which applies to
both male and female, is "acting superior to the other because of extreme dislike or some
other reason." See, e.g., the definition of "nashiz" in 4 ABu JA'FAR AL-TABARI, TAFsIR AL-
TABARi (16 vols.) 64, 304 (9th Century, reprint, Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmlyah, 1992)
(providing authority for the view that the word "nushuz'" for men and women means "to act
superior, to desire separation from the other;" but also providing other authority for the
definition of a female nashiz as one who disobeys her husband).
64. See 4 ABDUL RAI-IMAN AL-JAZIRI, KrrAB AL-FIQH 'ALA AL-MATHAHmIB AL-ARIA'AH
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marriage cannot be concluded without such a wali who is required to be male and
is usually her father.65 The requirement that a walt contract the marriage was his-
torically defended as a protective measure for women who may be swept by their
emotions. It also protects the family's honor, in cases where women may elect to
marry ineligible males.66 This rationale was found so appealing that even Hanafis,
who recognized the right of the adult women to contract her own marriage without
a walt, expressed their preference for the woman's delegation of that right to a
wali.
67
Jurists also generally concur, with the notable exception of the Malikis, that a
bikr's marriage cannot be concluded without her consent. Jurists also agree (with
the exception of some Malikis) that it is not necessary to inform the bikr that her
silence constitutes consent.63 Schools differ as to the duration and nature of the
wilayah (guardianship) of marriage.69
Muslim jurists viewed the wali requirement as an expression of their protec-
tiveness of innocent and naive Muslim women who may be victimized by design-
ing men. This concern appears reasonable, but it makes sense legally only if we
adopt a patriarchal view of women. A rational independent woman of sound
judgment requires no protection (although she may seek advice); an emotional,
dependent and impulsive woman does. This fact was pointed out by Abu Hanifah
who recognized the mature woman's right to contract her own marriage. Hanafis
and others holding this point of view noted that since Islam gave women the right
to contract in financial matters without interference or guardianship from any one,
women should be equally able to contract their own marriage without the need for
a wali.70 We now take a closer look at the Hanafi and Maliki views.
(5 vols.) 51 (Beirut, Dar Ihya' al-Turath al-Arabi, 1969); see also MUHAMMiAD JAWAD
MAGmHNYAH, AL-FIQH 'ALA AL-MATHAHM AL-KHtAMsAH 321(Beirut, Dar al-'llm li al-
Malayin 6th ed., 1969); AaMAD FARMi, AL-ZAvAj WA AHKAr.U Ft MATHHAB AML AL-
SuNNAH 126-34 (Mansourah, Egypt, Dar al-Wafa, 1989).
65. AHMAD GHANDOUR, AL-AmWAL AL-SHAKHStYAH Fi AL-TAsHma' AL-IsLA iu 122,
135-36 (Kuwait, Jami'at al-Kuwait Press, 1972); FARAj, supra note 64, at 126; 4 AL-JAzInI,
supra note 64, at 52-53; see also MuHAAztAD AnU ZAHRAi, MUHADARAT Fl 'AQD AL-
ZAWAJ VA ATHARUH 135, 139 (Egypt, Dar al-FiKr al-Arabi, 1958); 7 MUWAFFAQ AL-DIN
IBN QUDAmAH, AL-MUGNmI (12 vols.) 337, 346 (12th Century, reprint, Beirut, Dar al-Kitab
al-'Arabi, n.d.).
66. 4 AL-JAZIR supra note 64, at 49-50. See, e.g., ABU ZAHRA, supra note 65, at 135;
9 MusLm, supra note 10, at 205 (al-Nawawi's commentary in the margin providing diver-
gent views on the need for a walt).
67. G- NDOUR, supra note 65, at 125-26. See ABU ZAHRAH supra note 65, at 136 and
related note 1, 154; see also I AmIAD AL-KHAMLISHI, AL-TA'LIQ 'ALA QAuNN AL-AiWnAL
AL-SHAXrYAH (2 vols.) 194 (Rabat, Maktabat al-Ma'arif, 1987).
68. See 9 MUSLIN, supra note 10, at 205 (al-Nawawi's commentary in the margin); see
also 6 MUHAmMAD IN AL-SHAWKANI NAYL AL-AwTAR (9 vols.) 254 (Beirut, Dar al-fil,
1973).
69. See, e.g., GHANDOUR, supra note 65, at 131-32; FARAJ, supra note 64 at 129-38.
70. GHANDOUR, supra note 65, at 126; Anu ZAHRAH, supra note 65, at 138; 4 AL-
JAznu, supra note 64, at 46; FARAJ, supra note 64, at 134, 136; MUHAMA=D ZAKARIYA AL-
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The Hanafi view: Under this view, a wali has only advisory powers, until the
ward chooses an "ineligible" husband. 71 At that point the wall acquires the power
to void the marriage, so long as no child has been born.72
As stated earlier, "eligibility" is a term of art, which has been endowed with a
broad range of meanings. The Prophet defines "eligibility" in terms of faith and
piety.73 But the Hanafi school departs from this pristine definition. Instead it de-
fines it in accordance with classist customs so as to include, in addition to religion,
lineage, financial condition, and skill or profession. Consequently, the definition
reflects traditional patriarchal concerns that were so strong as to justify ignoring
the woman's choice and voiding her marriage.74
Furthermore, the patriarchal stereotype of women as irrational, dependent and
impulsive (the "Stereotype") plays an important role in permitting the Hanafi wall
to void an unsuitable marriage. It is based on the view that women, as a group, are
vulnerable to designing men and in need to be saved from their grip by the "other"
men in the women's live, namely walls.75 One may view this argument as a cover
BARDiSi, AL-AHKAM AL-IsLAMrVAH F AL-A-wAL AL-SHAKHSr'AH 199 (Egypt, Dar al-
Nahda al-'Arabiyah, 1965).
71. GHANDOUR, supra note 65, at 126; AL-BARDIsi, supra note 70 at 199; see 4 AL-
JAZuRu, supra note 64, at 51; see also FARAJ, supra note 64, at 128; 1 MUHAMMAD At-DIjWI,
AL-AHwAL AL-SHAKHSIYAH LI AL-MISRYrN AL-MUSLIMIN 48 (Cairo, Dar al-Nashr Ii al-
Jami'aat al-Misriyah, n.d.).
72. See 4 AL-JAZRi., supra note 64, at 51, 56; AL-DuWY, supra note 71, at 48; AHu
ZAHRAH, supra note 65, at 173; AL-BARD IS, supra note 70, at 192.
73. See FARAJ, supra note 64, at 11; see also AL-DuwI, supra note 71, at 55; ABu
ZAhmRm- supra note 65, at 169, 171, n.1; 6 AL-SHAWKANI, supra note 68, at 262.
74. See 4 AL-JAzHU, supra note 64, at 54-58; see also FARAJ, supra note 64, at 111-12;
Ano ZAHRAH, supra note 65, at 163-67. The story of Sheikh Ali Yusuf, whose marriage to
Safiyah al-Sadat was annulled (faskh), is one major example of the issue at hand. The case,
which took place in 1904, sharply divided public opinion in Egypt. Sheikh Ali was born to
a poor family in a distant Egyptian village. In time, however, he was able to build a highly
successful career as an activist journalist, and accumulated substantial wealth. He asked for
the hand of Safiyah Sadat, a beautiful womar from an aristocratic family. After princes,
ministers and other leaders of the community interceded on his behalf, the father accepted
and the engagement was announced. But, for years, the father refused to set a marriage
date. Finally, Sheikh Ali took matters into his own hands. He agreed with Safiyah to
marry, and the marriage took place without the father's knowledge. The father sued in
family court for annulment on the basis that Sheikh Ali did not meet the "eligibility" re-
quirement. He particularly noted that Sheikh Ali did not have a noble ancestry comparable
to that of Safiyah. Furthermore, he added, Sheikh Ali's profession was a lowly one. The
court then ordered Safiyah to return to her father's house until the case was decided. She
vehemently refused to do so, but moved
instead to a third location. In the meantime, the public was hotly debating the issue. Fi-
nally, the court ordered that the marriage be annulled, and the order was affirmed by the
higher court. Later, after additional efforts by leading members of the community, the father
relented and permitted a new marriage contract to take place. For more on this story, see I
AL-DIwi, supra note 71 at 539-53.
75. See 4 AL-JAzmi, supra note 64, at 49; see also 7 IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 65, at
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for more serious economic and class concerns by walis. In either case, it enables a
wall to stop his ward from taking the "wrong" decision. Notice that young men
can make "wrong" choices with no fear of interference. But part of the rationale is
that the male's social status is not derived from that of his wife; the woman's
status, however, is derived from that of her husband.76 This means that these ju-
risprudential decisions were not reached in a vacuum. Rather, as they should, they
took into account the kind of society in which these rules were formulated. There-
fore, as society changes and women increasingly acquire their own independent
social standing, the older rules must be reformulated to facilitate the change and
reflect new realities.
The interaction of the various Codes' requirement that the woman delegate the
right to contract her marriage to her wall with the wall 's right to object to the
marriage if the husband is not eligible is particularly troublesome. If the powers
conferred by these provisions are misused by the wall, a marriage may be blocked
altogether and forever, unless the female is willing to sue her wali. While many
Codes contain provisions that prevent the wall from unjustifiably preventing his
ward from getting married, it is unlikely that the majority of wronged women
would seriously consider availing themselves of these provisions and suing their
wali.n Such course of action is not realistic in Muslim countries, even in extreme
cases. Litigation causes negative social consequences for the female and for her
relationship with the wall who is probably her father and sole provider. To solve
this problem, the legislature in Muslim countries must be relied on to devise more
realistic ways to prevent and punish abuses by the wali.
Most importantly, the legislator must revisit certain fundamental issues. For
example, despite the partially enlightened Hanafi view on the role of a wall, one
must raise the question as to why is a woman required to have a wali at all today,
especially since men are not subject to the same requirement. There are three an-
swers to this question. The first is claimed to derive from the Qur'an and I shall
address that claim in a separate section. The second is based on the Stereotype,
while the third points to the nature of patriarchal society which shows no mercy
towards women who are not protected by men. In the latter two cases, the argu-
ment in favor of a wali appears to proceed from the desire to protect women.
While such an attitude is laudable, the iwali requirement must be restated as a
voluntary option for the mature woman, which once exercised by her becomes
binding upon the wall. The Stereotypical view of women which is demonstrably
false must be abandoned, along with its attendant compulsory protectionism. In
making this demand, I am mindful of the fact that many of the recent rulers in
Muslim countries, and colonialist powers before them, have historically resorted to
339; AL-BARDIsI, supra note 70, at 196 (evaluating the assumption).
76. See 4 AL-JAZIR, supra note 64, at 57, 60; see also ABU ZAHRAH supra note 65, at
170.
77. See 4 AL-JAzIR, supra note 64, at 50 (discussing the importance of keeping a good
relationship by the woman with her wai); cf GHANDOuR, supra note 65, at 140-41 (noting
the case of a Kuwaiti woman who sued her wall for blocking her marriage unfairly to an
eligible male and won).
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similar protectionist arguments to deny citizens their political liberties. While such
attitudes served in some cases only to delay political independence or the emer-
gence of democracy in some countries, more often they have resulted in a great
deal of upheaval and social instability. Learning from that experience, one must
conclude that an orderly change of outdated family laws is highly advisable.
The Maliki view: A Maliki father (acting as a wali) can force his bikr daughter,
regardless of her age into marrying a man of his choice unless the father had pre-
78
viously declared his daughter mature. Jurists justified this position by relying on
the Stereotype. They argued that the virgin (who might be a 35 year old lawyer or
physician) lacks experience in men and may be swayed by emotion in reaching her
decision.79 Malikis allowed such bikr daughter to escape a forced marriage only if
the prospective husband suffered from mental illness or from certain serious dis-
eases like leprosy or sexual impotence.80 The ability of the wall to force his ward
into marriage does not extend to women who are not bikr or women whose wall
has declared them mature.8' The Maliki eligibility requirement is closer to the sun-
nah, requiring only piety and freedom from serious illnesses and diseases.
82
A major indication that this part of the Maliki jurisprudence is no longer suit-
able for today's world, is the fact that Morocco has recently amended its Code to
delete the oppressive provision which permits a forced marriage by a wali. The
rest of the wilayah jurisprudence remains intact and continues to complicate social
relationships.
2. Ta'ah
As elaborated by traditional jurists of the various major schools, this con-
cept is perhaps the most degrading to the Muslim woman. It diminishes her fun-
damental liberties as a human being worthy of equal status under the law. Ta'ah
enables the husband to prohibit the wife from leaving her home, unless she is
willing to risk loss of financial support and, in some cases, divorce. While many
Codes contain a few carve-outs that permit legitimate exceptions to this nle, it
shocks the conscience to have the rule in the first place. One wonders what would
Khadijah, the successful business woman and wife of the Prophet, say to those
medieval jurists who confined wives to their homes and permitted their unauthor-
78. See 2 ABI AL-BARAKAT AHMAD AL-DARDR, AL-SHARH AL-SAGHIR (4 vols.) 353-54
(18th Century, reprint, Cairo, Dar al-Ma'aref, 1972); see also 4 AL-JAZIl, supra note 64, at
33; FARAJ, supra note 64, at 130.
79. See ABuZAHRAH, supra note 65, at 137-38; FARAJ, supra note 64, at 130, 136; 4
AL-JAZIIu, supra note 64, at 49.
80. See 4 AL-JAZau, supra note 64, at 33; see also FARA, supra note 64, at 130.
81. 2 AL-DARDIR, supra note 78, at 353-54; see also 4 AL-JAZIRI, supra note 64, at 33;
FARAJ, supra note 64, at 131. These women can also escape such a marriage, usually, but
through a different provision of the law.
82. 4 AL-JAZIRI, supra note 64, at 58; see also ABU ZAHRAH, supra note 65, at 167;
FARAJ, supra note 64, at 115.
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ized exit only in cases of extreme necessity.8
This power to confine the wife in her home was described by some traditional
jurists as ihtibas and was viewed as the quidpro quo for her maintenance& Under
this point of view, the woman was allowed to visit and receive her family a limited
number of times during the year without her husband's consent, although other ju-
rists argued even against this modest carve-out.85 This traditional jurisprudence is
not obsolete. As pointed out earlier, unless a specific provision of traditional ju-
risprudence is explicitly ruled out by the Code, it is part of that Code by incorpo-
ration. Furthermore, every reference in the Code to "custom" is a reference to an
anachronistic patriarchal custom on which much of this traditional jurisprudence is
based.
The concept of ta'ah as now presented in the Codes is a patriarchal hierarchical
construct which, as I shall argue later, contradicts the fundamental Islamic concept
of tawhid (the unity of God). In fact, a critique of the Taah concept would be
very similar to a critique of the concept of ta'ah as used in the political arena. The
notion of ta'ah to the ruler has also been rendered extremely hierarchical and op-
pressive. Strict forms of Ta'ah are due only to God, and not to a ruler or husband.
Human-oriented ta'ah is a much more modest concept based on a variety of re-
quirements, such as those of shura (consultation) and genuine consent whether in
the public or private sphere. Furthermore, it is symmetrical in that the ruler is also
required to obey the will of the people and serve them just as much as the people
are required to obey the ruler.86 The people's limits of their obedience are defmed
by God (as is the ruler's). The nature of that obedience is one which is more akin
to self-discipline, collective organization and mutual responsibility and advice than
to hierarchy, oppression and violence. The same is true of ta'ah in marriages.
I have come across too many decent frightened women whose lives have been
frittered away because their husbands did not "permit' them to go out or have a
reasonable measure of autonomy. I have also heard too many stories about di-
vorces "caused" by the wife's disobedience. This unbelievable oppression is an
intolerable violation of Qur'anic and international standards of human dignity.
Men would never tolerate confinement by their spouses for a split second, yet
Muslim women one century after another have been denied that same basic human
right. All of this was done in the name of Islam and under the twin doctrines of
ta'ah and "al-Qararfi al-bayt" (staying put at home). The latter doctrine is also
claimed to be based on the Qur'an. Later in this section, I will focus on one major
83. See ABu ZAHRAH supra note 65, at 196; see also AL-BARDIS, supra note 70, at
330-32 (providing reasons for restricting the wife's mobility); 2 AL-GIIAZALU, supra note
14, at 58-59; 8 IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 65, at 129.
84. See, e.g., AL-BARDs, supra note 70, at 292-93; 4 KAMAL AL-DiN AL-StwAsst,
SmARH FA-H AL-QADiR 378-80 (13th Century, reprint, Egypt, Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi
Press, n.d.)(text and commentary).
85. See ABU ZAHRAi, supra note 65, at 196; see also 2 AL-GHAZAU, supra note 14, at
58-59; 8 IBN QUDAMA-, supra note 65, at 129.
86. See AL-HIBRI, supra note 13, at 11-26.
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argument (involving the concept of qiwamah), based on a Qur'anic ayah and used
by patriarchal jurists for the subjugation of Muslim women. Other arguments will
be treated in future articles.
It is relevant to mention that Muslim jurists have always recognized the validity
of including certain conditions in the marriage contract. 87 These conditions tend to
be protective of the woman and some of them, such as the right of the woman to
divorce her husband at will or the right to refuse to move with him away from her
town, clearly limit the husband's right to ta'ah within the family. Clearly, there-
fore, even within traditional jurisprudence, the husband's right to ta'ah can be ne-
gotiated away. It is interesting in this regard to mention the marriage contract for
the third marriage of Sukaynah, the granddaughter of the Prophet who was known
for her piety and independence. Supposedly, it included conditions that would be
defined by most of the Codes today as nushuz. For example, Sukaynah included in
the contract the condition that her husband may not prohibit her from doing what
she wanted.88 She also required him not to contradict her wishes.89 A third condi-
tion was that he may not touch another woman while married to her.90 If such re-
ports were accurate, then it would appear that Sukaynah transferred contractually
to her husband (at least partially) the duty of obedience.
The Prophet's sunnah itself indicates a lack of commitment to a gender-based
division of labor and hence to ihtibas. His wife Khadijah was a prominent business
woman. After her death, the Prophet married A'isha who became a distinguished
political and religious leader. Both enjoyed the full freedom of locomotion, a fact
which at several points caused A'isha problems. The Prophet himself mended his
own clothes, cut meat, and performed other household chores. 91 In short, as a hus-
band, the Prophet did not demand "obedience" at home. Instead, his private life
was characterized by cooperation and consultation, all to the amazement of some
of the men who knew about it.92 This egalitarian model is not the basis of the
Codes which have departed from this sunnah.
The present situation cannot be corrected by merely revising the Codes dis-
cussed in this article. Revision would be a good start. But much more is needed,
for example, religious re-education of Muslims. Muslims need to know what is
the proper Islamic position with respect to the status of women. Muslims should
87. Anu ZAHRAH, supra note 65, at 186; 4 AL-JAZuu, supra note 64, at 85-89 (text and
notes); MAGHNIYAH, supra note 64, at 301-02.
88. 16 ABU AL-FARAJ AL-ISBAHANi, KTAB AL-AGHANI 102 (9th Century, reprint, Bei-
rut, Dar al-Thaqafah, 1959). See 'A'IsHAH ABD AL-RAHMAN (BINT AL-SHATI'), SUKAYNAH
BiNT AL-HUsSAIN 106 (Egypt, Dar al-Hilal, 1965) (listing reported conditions in Sukaynah's
marriage contracts).
89. AL-ISBAHANI, supra note 88, at 102.
90. ABD AL- RAHMAN, supra note 88, at 106. AI-Mansur, the famous Abbaside states-
man also entered a marriage contract which prevented him from additional marriages.
KAHALAH, OMAR, AL-ZAwA 57 (Beirut, Mu'assassat al-Risalah, 1977).
91. 2 AL-GHAZALI, supra note 14, at 354; see also ABU AL-HAssAN AL- NADAWi, AL-
SmAH AL-NABAWIYAH 370 (Jeddah, Dar al-Shuruq, 1977).
92. 2 ABu SHUQQAH, supra note 7, at 147-49, 153.
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be informed about the corruption of Islam by authoritarian/patriarchal cultural in-
fluences. Re-education should be introduced in a well-conceived manner and syn-
chronized with a plan to raise popular consciousness and create a new consensus.
As a first step towards righting this monumental wrong against Muslim women,
we must educate women and their parents about the necessity of including in the
marriage contract conditions that would protect the wife. But first, let us discuss
the right of the woman to initiate divorce which raises similar problems and solu-
tions.
3. The Right of the Woman to Initiate Divorce
Jurists disagree on whether to give the right to initiate divorce to the wife, and
those who gave her that right disagree on the form in which she may have it. But
all jurists agree that it is not a right that she is entitled to automatically. In places
where the right was recognized, the woman had to bargain for it at the outset. Oth-
erwise, she had only standard traditional solutions; namely, seeking judicial action
or buying her freedom from her husband through khul'.
The position of jurists on this issue derives to a large extent from their position
on two more basic issues: (a) the Stereotype, and (b) the validity of conditions in
the marriage contract. Jurists use the Stereotype to argue against giving women
the right to divorce. They argue that women are by nature emotional, and hence if
given that right, they might use it unadvisedly in an angry moment.9 3 On the sec-
ond issue, patriarchal assumptions were deeply embedded in the reasoning of ju-
rists. Let us see how.
Since the marriage contract is a contract, it stands to reason that the parties
should be able to negotiate its terms to reflect the kind of marital relation they
would like to have. But jurists placed important limitations on agreements result-
ing from these negotiations. All Codes and jurisprudence permit only those con-
ditions in the contract which do not contradict the contract's goal and purposes.9
The limitation sounds quite reasonable until we realize that these goals and pur-
poses were defined from an archaic patriarchal perspective which damaged the
rights of women. Consequently, some perfectly legitimate conditions were de-
clared by some jurists as unacceptable.
For example, for Malikis (and many others) a condition in the marriage contract
93. 4 AL-JAzIRI, supra note 64, at 370; see also MUHANINIAD ABU ZAHRAH, AL-AHWAL
AL-SHAKHSIYAH 283 (3rd ed., Egypt, Dar al-Fikr al-Ambi, 1957); AL-BARDIS, supra note
70, at 356. Actually, one could argue that the opposite is true, namely that the male is the
emotional partner who acts rashly in anger. As proof, I note that the male is given by di-
vine law a period of time (.iddah) during which he may revoke the divorce he sought and
obtained. The woman has no such opportunity for retracting a idul ' divorce once it is
granted. See GHANDOuR, supra note 65, at 292 (discussing the importance of the husband's
right to revoke a divorce which he may have initiated during a fit of anger).
94. ABU ZAHRAH, supra note 93, at 159; 6 AL-SH\VKANIv, supra note 68, at 281.
19971
AM U. J INT'L L. & POL'Y
which eliminates the husband's duty to support the wife is invalid.95 One arguably
noble reason for this position is the protection of economically dependent women
who may be unable to defend their basic rights, such as the right to maintenance.
Yet, an unfortunate consequence of this position is that, given the rest of the
Maliki jurisprudence on this matter, the position also operates to preserve the tra-
ditional patriarchal model in which the husband supports the wife in exchange for
her housework, sexual availability and/or confinement.
96
In today's world, the Maliki position runs afoul of the fact that regardless of
their marriage contracts, many Muslim women in Maliki jurisdictions are the main
(if not sole) income earners of their families. 97 To deal with this new situation,
new arrangements which take into account new economic realities must be con-
templated by jurists. Simply permitting the wife to work without explicit permis-
sion from her husband does not suffice. The Code cannot turn a blind eye to these
new economic realities and continue to regard the male as the "boss" in his family,
simply by virtue of his being male and regardless of his contributions or the lack
of them to his family.
The patriarchal treatment of conditions in the marriage contract creates legal
problems in at least two different ways. Problems may arise when a party inadver-
tently includes in its contract a void condition. They may also arise from a willful
violation of a perfectly valid condition. In addition to the wife's right to divorce,
among the most commonly discussed conditions are those that prohibit the hus-
band from taking a second wife and from moving the wife away from her home-
town.
Hanafis recognize the validity of a condition in the marriage contract which
gives the wife the right to divorce the husband at will.98 While Hanafis, like other
jurists, regard the right to divorce as residing initially with the husband, they rec-
ognize the valid transfer of that right (tafwid) to the wife as a result of contract ne-
gotiations. 99 Consequently, they readily honor such a condition to the fullest and
do not permit the husband to withdraw the transfer after marriage. 100
Hanafis consider the condition prohibiting the husband from taking another
95. 4 AL-JAzIRI, supra note 64, at 88. KAWTHAR KAMEL 'ALl, SHURUT 'AQD AL-ZAWAJ
FI AL-SHAR'AH AL-ISLAMiyAH 71 (Cairo, Dar al-I'tisam, 1979).
96. It is important to note here that several major jurists do not consider housework as a
wifely duty. Their view is that marriage is about companionship not service. Anu ZAHRAH,
supra note 65, at 197 ( reporting that Abu Hanifah, Malik and al-Shafi'i espouse the view
that wives have no duty to perform housework). He also mentions other jurists, including
himself, who disagree with this view. Id.
97. MA'ADI ZAiNAB, AL-'UsRAH AL-MAGHRBIYAH BAYN AL-KHITAB AL-SHAR'I WA AL-
KHITAB AL-SHA'BI 124-37 (al-Risalah Press, 1988).
98. 1 AL-KHAMuisi, supra note 67, at 322. 4 AL-JAznR, supra note 64, at 85.
GHANDOUR, supra note 65, at 344-50; 2 AL-DARDIR, supra note 78 at 593-603; 8 IBN
Q DAMAH, supra note 65, at 287-303.
99. 1 AL-KHAMLISHI, supra note 67, at 322; GHANDOUR, supra note 65, at 349.
100. 1 AL-KHAMLISm, supra note 67, at 322.
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wife null and void because it is viewed as encroaching upon a legitimate right of
the husband]10 Hanafis have reached this conclusion despite the various historical
precedents to the contrary, such as that of Prophet's refusal to allow his son-in-law
to take a second wife. Therefore, a wife who includes this condition in her mar-
riage contract must make sure that she is not in a Hanafi jurisdiction. Otherwise,
the condition is void, the husband may violate it with impunity, the marriage con-
tract remains valid and she has no recourse other than Idul' or judicial divorce.
Fortunately, several Codes in Hanafi jurisdictions have parted company with Ha-
nafi jurisprudence on this point.I°2
Where the violation relates to a valid condition (other than a valid right to di-
vorce), the Hanafi remedy is a modest monetary one equaling the reduction in the
wife's dowry resulting from the inclusion of the violated condition. 1 3 This rem-
edy, as well as the Hanafi treatment of marriage contract conditions in general,
leads one to conclude that Hanafis did not seriously consider all of the needs and
rights of women in this area. Recognizing that conditions are usually introduced
into a standard marriage contract in order to protect the wife's rights, the Hanafi
attitude towards such conditions appears as highly patriarchal. The Hanafi view is
also contrary to the Prophet's position which ranked promises (conditions) in the
marriage contract highest among all types of promises, and urged their fulfill-
ment.' 4 Only the Hanbali school follows carefully the Prophet's pronouncement
on this matter.105
Hanafis disagree on whether a prohibition against relocating the wife is binding,
but they do accept the condition giving the wife the right to divorce. Their justifi-
cation is that women must be provided with an inducement to marry. It appears
therefore that many Hanafi women were hesitant to marry if they were not given a
valid right to divorce. In response, jurists recognized the related condition as
valid, but not without introducing into the situation an element of complication.
They accepted the condition as valid only in cases where it was negotiated as part
of the marriage contract or after its execution upon a request initiated by the pro-
spective wife.
0 6
Malikis also recognize the validity of a condition giving the wife the right to di-
vorce, but they complicate that right. Among other things, the validity of the right
appears to depend upon the form through which it was transferred. 0 7 Further-
101. See 7 IBN QuDAMAH, supra note 65, at 448-49; K. 'Ali, supra note 95, at 71-72.
102. See, e.g., The Egyptian Code, supra note 27, Law No. 25 (1929) (amended 1985),
Art. 2 cl. 11 (repeated); see also The Jordanian Code, supra note 29, Ch. 3, Art. 19 (1).
103. AL-BARDisi, supra note 70, at 270. See also I MUHA.MiAD MBN YAHYA IN AL-
MuTAflHAR, AHKA'i AL-AHwAL AL-SHAKHSrvAH MIN FIQH AL-SHARI'AH AL-ISAI . AHt (2
vols.)157 (Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-lslamiyah, 1985); 6 AL-SHAwVKAN4 supra note 68, at
280-81.
104. ABu ZAHRAH, supra note 65, at 187.
105. See id at 186-87; see also 7 InN QUDAMAH, supra note 65, at 448-49.
106. 4 AL-JAZuu, supra note 64, at 85 n.1; 1 AL-KHAmLush, supra note 67, at 322.
107. I discuss this issue in great detail in Azizah al-Hibri, Marriage Lmts in Muslim
Countries, 4 INt'L REv. COMP. PUB. POL' Y 227, 235 (1992). Also see 1 AL-KIAM,1SHI,
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more, the wife may lose that right inadvertently, if she willingly engages in sexual
intercourse with her husband or fails to utilize her right to divorce in a timely
fashion.' 08 She may also lose it as a result of unilateral unsolicited judicial ac-
tion.1°9 Malikis recognize the validity of other conditions, such as the condition
prohibiting the husband from taking a second wife and from relocating the wife."10
In short, under traditional jurisprudence which relies on the Stereotype, Muslim
women do not have an unfettered right to divorce, similar to that of their husbands.
Furthermore, even in jurisdictions that recognize the validity of a negotiated right
to divorce, social pressures make it almost impossible for a proud patriarchal male
to accept this condition in his marriage contract. Finally, when some women suc-
cessfully acquire the right to divorce, it can be inadvertently lost in some jurisdic-
tions. In the absence of a valid right to divorce, the wife has to resort to courts or
to the method of khul' to exit her marriage. Under this method as practiced today,
the wife obtains the consent of the husband to the divorce by paying him a sum of
money. The husband may refuse to grant his consent at any price or demand a
very high price for his consent. As a result, the wife may be unable to regain her
liberty even through khul".
Originally, khul'was meant to be an equitable solution. According to Prophetic
precedent, a woman who does not like her husband through no fault of his own has
the option of leaving him, so long as she returns to him the mahr (usually trans-
lated as dowry) he gave her. The actual story goes as follows: a woman developed
great dislike for her husband, through no fault of his own. She went to the Prophet
seeking a way out of the marriage. The Prophet instructed her to return to the man
his mahr (in this case, a garden). She was so pleased by the prospect of ending the
marriage that she offered to give the husband other things as well. The Prophet
said: "As for the garden, yes. As for more, no. '11
The idea was that it would be unfair for the wife who decides to leave her hus-
band through no fault of his own to do so and take the mahr as well without hav-
ing fulfilled her part of the contract. Yet, today, as a result of centuries of patriar-
chal jurisprudence, women are expected to pay more than their mahr in order to
obtain divorce by khul'. The situation has become so serious that at times it has
resembled blackmail. 12 This state of affairs is the direct result of the fact that ju-
rists made the husband's consent necessary to the khul' process. Obviously, this
condition does not have strong jurisprudential support and is ignored in some ju-
supra note 67, at 323-28.
108. 1 AL-KHAMNISHI, supra note 67 at 323-24.
109. AI-Hibri, supra note 107, at 235; 1 AL-KHAMmsIw, supra note 67, at 323-24.
110. 4 AL-JAZIu, supra note 64, at 88; al-Hibri, supra note 107, at 236; cf MUHAMMAD
BiN JuZAYy, QAWANIN AL-AHKAM AL-SHAR'rAH 243 (14th Century, reprint, Beirut, Dar al-
'Ilm Li al-Malayin, 1979) (distinguishing among the different ways by which the condition
is introduced into the marriage contract and the related consequences).
111. 8 IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 65, at 173-75, 182-83.
112. See 2 MUHAMAD RASHID RIDHA, TAFsi AL-QUR'AN AL-HAKIM (TASIR AL-MANAR)
(12 vols.) 435 (Beirut, Dar al-Ma'rifa, 1947) (describing abuses by husbands of the Khul'
process).
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risdictions, such as Pakistan. 113 All these facts point to the corruption of Islamic
values and women's rights by Patriarchy. To further bolster this thesis, I address
one major traditional claim, namely that all these laws and the Stereotype are
rooted in the Qur'an and not in patriarchal tradition.
THE QUR'ANIC VIEW OF GENDER RELATIONS
Many good Muslim women and men will disagree in good faith with my argu-
ments in this article. This disagreement is not surprising; even the views of the
best Muslim jurists were contested by some of their contemporaries. But there is
also the possibility of diminishing or eliminating some areas of disagreement; oth-
erwise, the science of logical argumentation would be futile. The best method for
resolving disagreements among Muslims is the one suggested by the Qur'an itself.
The Qur'an clearly states that if believers disagree among themselves on a matter,
they should seek the answer in the Qur'an and the sunnah of the prophet" 4 1 shall
follow this Qur'anic advice. Because of space limitations, however, I am concen-
trating in this article on only part of one ayah, leaving the treatment of the remain-
ing parts of the ayah, other ayahs and related hadith for the future. This means
that any systematic disagreements will not be settled by this article, but I hope that
some progress towards a proper resolution will occur.
All Muslims agree that the Qur'an is rich with meaning. Furthermore, the
structure of Qur'anic truth is at once both absolute and dialectical. It is absolute in
so far as it is the Word of God. It is dialectical because our developing human
consciousness grasps that absolute truth in a dialectical manner which grows as we
grow in our understanding. The Qur'an itself recognizes this human limitation in
its methodology. It was revealed gradually, and some of its prohibitions (such as
drinking alcohol) were also imposed gradually. Other prohibitions and fundamen-
tal changes (like those relating to women and slaves) were introduced so as to
achieve their final results over a period of time. This part of Qur'anic philosophy
is not only based on the principle of gradualism in social change but also on the
divine wisdom of fostering human democracy, i.e., the society's collective ability
to make its own choices."5  Otherwise, God would have initially denied us all
freedom of choice and imposed all truths upon us. This result, however, would be
contrary to the Qur'anic assertion that there is no compulsion in matters of relig-
ion." 6
113. See K= HODYINSON, MusLzI FAMILY LAW: A SouRcEBoOK 285-287 (London,
Croom Helm 1984) (relating criticism by a Pakistani court of the consent requirement). See
also AL-KHAMTSHI, supra note 67, at 335 (describing this point).
114. QuR'AN 4:59. Where English Qur'anic translations were used in this article, I re-
lied primarily on the translation of A. YusuF ALl, THE HOLY QuR'AN: TExr, TRANsLAmiON
AND CoMAmrARY (Brentwood, Maryland, Amana Corp. 1983). I have modified this
translation at times to make it more precise.
115. AI-Hibri, supra note 13, at 9-10.
116. QUR'AN 2:256.
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For example, the Qur'an did not prohibit slavery outright in a world in which
slavery was rampant and economically very significant. Instead, it provided rules
and principles which if followed by pious Muslims carefully, would have totally
eliminated slavery in a generation or two. The fact that it took the world in gen-
eral, and Muslims in particular, many centuries to achieve the Islamic ideal of
eliminating slavery only illustrates how deeply rooted that idea was in the world
community, and how extensive the changes necessary for achieving it were.
Therefore, it is important to understand the Qur'anic worldview in order to try
and capture those absolute truths in it that we need to approximate in our present
world. The central concept in the Qur'an is that of Tawhid, i.e. that there is only
one supreme being and that being is God. This concept permeates the whole
Qur'an. For our present purposes, it is instructive to approach it from the perspec-
tive provided by the story of the fall of Iblis (Satan). According to the Qur'an,
Iblis's fall from grace was the result of his vanity. He was the only one who re-
fused to obey God's order to bow to Adam. Iblis objected to God, saying: "I am
better than him; you created me from fire and created him from clay."' This
statement captured the essence of Satanic logic which is based on feelings of such
vanity and superiority that it posits (in the minds of the vain) a layer of demi-Gods
between God and his creatures. These demi-gods are so arrogant and self-centered
that they end up disobeying God in order to impose their will and preserve their
vanity. In one stroke they commit both shirk (denial of tawhid) and disobedi-
ence. 1
9
Muslims who are vain and arrogant, whether for individual, racial, economic or
gender-related reasons, engage in Satanic logic. The Qur'an states clearly and re-
peatedly that we were all created from the same nafs (soul). 20 In particular, the
very first ayah in surat al-Nisa' states: "0 people! reverence God (show piety to-
wards God) who created you from one nafs and created from her (the nafs) her
mate and spread from them many men and women; and reverence God, through
whom you demand your mutual rights, and the wombs (that bore you), (for) God
watches you.'
121
The question presented by this ayah is this: if all humans are made of the same
nafs, why did God create so many differences among us? The Qur'an again pro-
vides us with answers. On the question of race and ethnicity, it tells us that we
were created as different tribes and nations, so that we may become acquainted
with each other (i.e., to enjoy each other's differences and company, or to put it
differently, variety is the spice of life).'22 On the question of gender, the Qur'an
informs us in surat al-Rum that God created for us from our anfus (plural of nafs)
117. I would like to note that the significance of this story was first brought to my atten-
tion by Sheikh Hassan Khalid, the late Mufti of Lebanon, may God rest his soul in peace.
118. QuR'AN7:12.
119. See 3 AL-GHAZALt, supra note 14, at 326-43.
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mates so that we may find tranquillity with them, and God put affection and mercy
between us.123 "That," the Qur'an adds, "is a sign for those who ponder."'124 (I will
refer to this ayah as the Equality Princi le.) This ayah on gender relations is re-
peated in various forms in the Qur'an.1 Consequently, we may justifiably con-
clude that it articulates a basic general principle about proper gender relations;
namely, that they are relations between mates created from the same naif, which
are intended to provide these mates with tranquillity, and are to be characterized
by affection and mercy. Such relations leave no room for Satanic hierarchies
which result only in strife, subordination and oppression.
26
One ayah appears to conflict with the Equality Principle. It is a highly contro-
versial ayah which is often cited by some secular feminists as proof that Islam is
structurally patriarchal. Because of this challenge, I have decided to address the
first (and most cited) part of this ayah in this paper. Again, the treatment can only
be rudimentary because of space limitations. But I hope that this treatment would
suffice to indicate the line of thought that needs to be adopted in explaining the
rest of the ayah and other similar ayahs that are often cited in discussing this issue.
The first part of the 34th ayah of surat al-Nisa' (which I will refer to as the
Complex Phrase) starts with the following statement which has often been used to
justify male dominance:
(i) Men are qawwamun over women bima Godfaddala some of them over
others, and bima they spend of their own money....
A modem translation of this phrase is the following:
(ii) Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because God has given
the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from
their means. 127
Translation (i) was intentionally left partial, because a full translation would
unilaterally resolve important issues left open by the original Arabic language. For
this reason, where the original Arabic meaning was critical but undetermined, I
kept the Arabic word. Because Translation (ii) settles all open issues, I find it
problematic. I now examine the Arabic words in (i).
123. Id. 30:21.
124. Id 30:21
125. See, e.g., id 35:11, 39:6; see also supra note 11. FARIDA BENNANJ, TAQsIM AL-
'AmAL BAYN AL-ZAWvJAYN 27-28 (Marakesh, Silsilat Manshurat Kuliyat al-'Ulum al-
Qanuniyah wa al-Iqtisadiyah wa al-Ijtima'iyah, Jami'at al-Qadhi 'Iyadh, 1992). Bennani, a
Moroccan Muslim, who is also a law professor, argues in this award winning book that the
Qur'an clearly states in several places that men and women are equal intellectually as well
as physically. She also relates hadiths to the same effect, and cites other evidence.
126. BENNAN!, supra note 125, at 13-14 (noting that Muslim patriarchal societies used
the concept of qiwama to create a hierarchical structure within the family, headed by the
husband). She also argues that such hierarchy contradicts the basic principle of gender
equality revealed in the Qur'an. Id at 27-28.
127. AUl, supra note 114, at 190.
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The word qawwam (singular of qawwamun) has been interpreted variously to
mean "head", "boss", "leader", "protector" or even "manager", "guide" and
"advisor". Meanings with strict hierarchical significance tend to be found in older
commentaries. Part of the reason for this discrepancy is rooted in the relational
meaning of the word. One old Arabic dictionary defines the related word
"qiyam", specifically in the context of the ayah, as "having the meaning of preser-
vation and betterment."' 28  Another old dictionary defines the related word
"qayyim" as: "one who manages the people's affairs, leads and straightens them
out.' 29 Both meanings, while not necessarily hierarchical, are open to hierarchical
authoritarian interpretations. So, where a society was authoritarian, it made sense
that interpreters colored these meanings with their own authoritarian perspec-
tive.'30 As the world changed, modem interpreters tried to regain for the word its
original meaning. Given my bias in favor of democracy, I shall opt for the less hi-
erarchical interpretations of the word.
The verb "faddala" in the Complex Phrase is usually translated as meaning
"being superior".' 3 ' Linguistically, "faddala" is explained as having a distinction,
a preferred difference over another, i.e. a feature or ability the other lacks. 2 At
this point, I ask the reader to resist concluding prematurely that the Qur'an there-
fore states that men and women are essentially different, and that the man is supe-
rior. That is in fact the patriarchal conclusion; mine is different, Later discussion
will place the word 'faddala" in the Complex Phrase in its proper context and
provide its full accurate meaning.
The word "bima" is the most complex in this passage. Linguistically, it is com-
posed of two parts: "bi" and "ma". The first is a connector with more than one
meaning. Among the most prevalent meanings of "bi" are: (a) one that conveys a
relation of causality (sababiyah or 'illiyah), (b) one which conveys circumstanti-
128. 11 MUHAMMAD IBN MANTHUR, LISAN AL-'ARAB (18 vols.) 355 (12th Century, re-
print, Beirut, Dar Ihya' al-Turath al-'Arabi 1992).
129. 5 ABI ABDUL RAHMAN AL-FARAHIDI, KrrAB AL-AYN (8 vols.) 232 (8th Century, re-
print, Beirut, Mu'assasat al- A'lami li al-Matbu'at 1988).
130. See, e.g., 2 RiDHA, supra note 112, at 380; 5 RWHA, supra note 112, at 67-70; see
also MUHAMMAD ABDUL HAMID, AL-AHwAL AL-SHAKHSIYAH FI AL-SHARI'AH AL-
ISLAMIYAH 122 (Cairo, Muhammad Sabih and Sons, 1966); 4 AL-TABARI, supra note 63, at
60 (calling men "princes" over women).
131. See, e.g., 5 RIDHA, supra note 112, at 67; GHANDOUR, supra note 65, at 235-36.
132. 10 IBN MANTHUR, supra note 128, at 280. Linguistically, the root verb "fadl
"refers to "the opposite of deficiency," and "fudalah" means remnant. See 7 AL-FARAHIDI,
supra note 129, at 43; IBN MANTHUR, supra note 128, at 281. Consequently, a secondary
meaning of the word reduces "faddala" to mere difference, without ascribing any value to
that difference. As a result of this secondary meaning, the science of differential equations
is called in many Arab universities "'im al-tafadul, " i.e., the science of difference. I do
not believe that this meaning is linguistically appropriate in the context under discussion.
The appropriate meaning here is the primary one of having some distinction, quality or at-
tribute the other does not have. But as we shall see later, this is not a reference to male su-
periority over women. Rather it is one of two requisite characteristics that a male must sat-
isfy before he can even attempt to advise a woman.
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ality (tharfiyah), and (c) one which conveys a quantity which is less than all
(tab'idh).'3 "Md' acts here as a pure connector (mmasuliah) but may have at
times a more enhanced meaning (indicating a masdar).34 It is used to refer to in-
animate objects only. 135
The critical meaning then of "bima' revolves mostly around the "bi" segment.
As a result, "bima' could mean: (a) "because", (b) "in circumstances where" and
(c) "in that which", a meaning which indicates tab 'idh, i.e., a portion or a part of
but not the whole.
Looking back at the above translation, we can now revise it to read:
(iii) Men are [advisors! providers of guidance ] to women [because/ in
circumstances where/ in that which] God made some of them different from
some others and [because/in circumstances where/ in that which] they spend of
their own money...
We are now ready to discuss the apparent conflict between the Equality Princi-
ple and the Complex Phrase. A basic rule of Islamic jurisprudence is the follow-
ing: where ayahs appear to conflict, they must be carefully studied in search of a
meaning that makes them consistent with each other.1 36 Another basic rule states
that one way to resolve apparent conflict between ayahs is to check the scope of
each.' 37 If one is general and the other is particular, then the second may be an ex-
ception to or a carve-out from the first.
Here, the Qur'anic phrase which articulates the Equality Principle is clearly
general. It has no qualifiers, provisos or carve-outs. It is also repeated in similar
forms several other times in the Qur'an.13 8 The ayah which articulates the Com-
plex Phrase is totally different in structure. In stating what appears to be a general
statement, namely that "men are qawwamun over women," the phrase immediately
provides an explanation. The explanation acts as a limitation upon the apparently
general statement (takhsis of the 'aam), by specifying the reasons ('illahs) or cir-
cumstances (as indicated by the various meanings of "bima") that would entitle a
male to be qawwam.'39 These include differences between some males and some
females. 40
133. These meanings can be found in a regular Arabic dictionary. See, e.g., MUHAe.1AD
ISBIR AD BUAL JuNAmI, AL-SH mL 235-36 (Beirut, Dar al-'Awdah, 1981). See also 1
FAKHR. AL-DiN AL-RAzI AL-MAusuL Fi 'ILM UsuL AL-FIQH (6 voLs.) 379, 381, n.3 (12th
Century, Beirut, Mu'assassat al-Risalah, 1992) (for the meaning of "tab 'idh").
134. ISBm AND JUNAIDI, supra note 133, at 764. See also infra note 132 and accompany-
ing text.
135. See, e.g., 2 AL-RAZI, supra note 133, at 333-34.
136. 2 AL-ZUHAYL, supra note 9, at 1177, 1182-83.
137. Id
138. See supra note 120.
139. SHALADI, supra note 8, at 428-29, 432-64.
140. BENNAN, supra note 125, at 35-36. Bennani and others point out that the structure
of the phrase permits the interpretation that the differences referred to there are not differ-
ences between men and women, but rather between men and other men. She argues that
1997]
AM. U. J INT'L L. & POL 'Y
The elements of this limitation are two. The first part of (iii), namely that men
are qawwamun over women, is a general statement. But it is operative only: (1)
where God has endowed a male (in a certain circumstance or at a certain time)
with a feature, ability or characteristic which a particular woman lacks (and pre-
sumably needs in that circumstance or at that time) and (2) that male is maintain-
ing that particular woman. Only under both of these conditions may the man pre-
sume to offer guidance or advice to the woman. The first element is important for
explaining why the advisory role of the male is acceptable at all, the second ele-
ment is important for limiting the advisory role to the man who is already taking
care of the woman as her provider (if the woman is indeed being provided for).
Otherwise, she may be faced with droves of men who want to provide unsolicited
advice (fudhullyun).
The Qur'an clearly indicates that not all men satisfy both conditions. For one,
as the above-mentioned meaning of "bimd' indicates, the reference in the ayah is
to a part of a group, but not the whole. The remaining text of the ayah reinforces
this fact when it explicitly uses the word "ba'dhuhum", which means "some".
More precisely, the remainder of the phrase speaks of "some" whom Godfaddala
over "some" others.' 4' (Note that the broad linguistic Qur'anic construction bears
also the interpretation that God "faddala" some men over some other men and
women and "faddalah" some women over some men and other women.) This
explicit use of "ba'dhuhum" in the second part of the phrase establishes the
tab 'idhi meaning of the whole phrase, since tab 'idh was indicated at least once and
perhaps twice in the Complex Phrase.
In other words, the Qur'an was describing (and not recommending) in this ayah
a situation akin to the traditional one existing at the time, where some women were
financially dependent. In those circumstances, the ayah informs us, God gave the
man supporting her the responsibility (taklif, not privilege) of offering the woman
guidance and advice in those areas in which he happens to be more qualified or
experienced. 142 The woman, however, is entitled to reject both (otherwise the ad-
visory role is no longer advisory).
Although my interpretation differs from that offered by traditional jurists, it is
based on traditional religious and linguistic sources. In that sense, it does not
constitute a departure from tradition. It is a traditional interpretation.143 As proof,
such differences are based on the man's ability to maintain his family.
141. It is interesting in this regard to examine the interpretation of RIDHA, 5 RIDHA, su-
pra note 112, at 68, in which he argues that, in this case, "some" means "all."
142. BENNANI, supra note 125, at 35, makes a similar point.
143. A recent article referred to this author as a "progressive purist" legal scholar. LINO
J. LAURO AND PETERA. SAMUELsON, 37 HARv. INT'L L. J. 65, at 127, 131(1996). The ar-
ticle defined a "purist" methodology as one which "seeks to overcome defects in an exist-
ing system through wholesale change or replacement." Id. at 66. As this and other articles
illustrate, my work is solidly based on traditional Islamic jurisprudence. It engages in care-
ful analysis of this jurisprudence in order to separate its cultural dimension from the relig-
ious one. In using this approach, I am careful to seek change only to the extent it is relig-
iously justifiable and necessary for safeguarding the rights of Muslim women. I reject a
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I offer a similar (but not identical) interpretation of "bima" offered by the famous
thirteenth century jurist al-Razi. 144
Al-Razi focused on the meaning of "bima" in another Qur'anic phrase directly
following the Complex Phrase in the same ayah. The other phrase states that:
Righteous women are qanitat and guard al-gaib bima God guarded.1
45
The noun "Qunut", from which the adjective "qanitaf' is derived, refers usu-
ally to the act of being devoutly obedient to God. Because "qanitat" means
"women who exhibit 'qunut' ", al-Razi, among other jurists, concluded that the
obedience of righteous women referred to here must be obedience to their hus-
bands as well as to God. 46
Similarly, the word "al-gaib" usually refers to the unknown, i.e., the future
which only God knows. But again, because the phrase spoke exclusively of
women, the word "al-gaib" was interpreted as referring to absent husbands, and
the relevant part of the above phrase was interpreted as referring to the wife's duty
to guard her chastity and her husband's property in his absence. 47 But I do not
intend here to discuss the meaning of this phrase. I am only interested in an
analysis of "bimd' in that phrase for the purpose of comparing it with my analysis
of the same word in the Complex Phrase. So, I now focus on the way a-Razi
analyzed "bima" in the above phrase in his famous Tafsir.
AI-Razi argued that "bima" in the phrase "bima God guarded" had one of the
following two meanings:
(a) "Bimd' may mean "that which", where "ma" acts as a pure connector.
Al-Razi then explained that given this meaning of "bima", the phrase means
that women are to guard the husband's rights in exchange for that which God
guarded of women's rights against their husbands 4 s
Notice that al-Razi's interpretation of "bima" does more than merely connect
the two parts of the phrase. As he himself observes, it expresses also causality
(sababiyah) between them through the use of the locution "in exchange for".
(b) "Bima" may be masdarah.
Under this category of Arabic grammar, the phrase means either "women guard
wholesale change partly for the reasons mentioned herein in the section entitled "The Im-
portance of An Internal Critique." Lauro and Samuelson appear to concur with my reason-
ing in this section when they point out that "many progressive purists "have presented a
false dilemma to many devout Muslims, who feel they must choose betveen God and mod-
ernization.' Id at 127. My analysis in this article presents no such dilemma. Hence., I do
not satisfy the definition of "progressive purist."
144. I also would like to suggest to those familiar with Arabic and the exact nature of the
words used in the Qur'an to reflect on how the meaning of the phrase would have changed
had the word "lima" been used instead of"bima." I found it significant that it was not.
145. QUR'AN 4:34.
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their husband's rights because (sababiyah) God helps women succeed in their ef-
fort (bi tawfiq il-lah)" or "women guard their husband's rights because
(circumstantial) they guard (i.e. obey) God's orders by obeying their husbands. 149
Thus al-Razi too provides at least two meanings of "bima" in this context, one of
causality and another of circumstantiality.
In addition to al-Razi, as I showed earlier, my analysis is supported by several
standard dictionaries.150 In other words, there is nothing extraordinary about the
linguistic analysis I provided for "bima" in the Complex Phrase. The problem
arises only when this analysis is taken seriously and an interpretation is based on
it. At that point, the fundamentally limiting scope of the Complex Phrase (whether
causal, circumstantial or tab'idhf) becomes apparent, a matter which traditional
jurists ignored or dismissed.151
Our linguistic analysis shows that the Complex Phrase makes perfect sense. In-
deed, if our conclusion is correct, the phrase about the qiwamah (state of being
qawwam) of certain women over certain men under similarly specified conditions
would also make sense from the theoretical point of view. Such a phrase, how-
ever, would not have addressed any existing conditions in need of limitation at the
time of revelation. Nevertheless, when at one point it became necessary to speak
of a symmetrical responsibility for guidance and protection between men and
women, the Qur'an did not hesitate. It said of male and female believers, that
some of them are wali 's of some of the other male and female believers. 152 Thus,
it is important to emphasize this ayah as a suitable foundation for gender relations
in today's Muslim societies.
The Complex Phrase was revealed in an authoritarian/patriarchal society that
the Prophet was attempting to civilize and democratize. Consequently, it should be
viewed for what it really is. It is a limitation on men which prevents them from
assuming automatically (as many did then) oppressive authoritarian roles with re-
spect to women. 53 At most, the Complex Phrase tells them, that they can guide
and advise only these women they support financially and then only when certain
conditions obtain. The rest of the ayah does not change this analysis if one takes a
fresh non-patriarchal look at it.
154
This result is also consistent with the Hanafi and Maliki views that a woman
may include in her marriage contract conditions that would give her greater rights
149. Id.; 4 AL-TABARI, supra note 63, at 61-63, has a somewhat similar explanation.
150. See supra notes 133-134.
151. See supra notes 126,141.
152. QuR'AN 9:71.
153. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
154. 1 hope to analyze the rest of the ayah and related concepts, such as wilayat al-
ta 'dib, in a series of subsequent articles. I also hope to address in those articles the hadiths
usually quoted in support of the subordination of women. For the purposes of the arguments
made in this paper, it is important to keep in mind that the traditional approach is to discard
or reinterpret hadiths that appear to contradict an ayah in the Qur'an.
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and freedoms within the marriage, including the right to divorce. 55 Such condi-
tions usually modify the traditional balance within the family in favor of the wife,
thus detracting from the male's "superiority" or authority. For this reason, they are
widely resisted, and when accepted are kept secret. Thus, when a female member
of the Jordanian parliament recently divorced her husband, many Jordanians were
shocked and some were even scandalized'56. The woman, Tujan al-Faisal, had in-
cluded in her marriage contract a condition which gave her the right to divorce.
When she finally exercised that condition, many (including women) argued that
the condition was either invalid, "unnatural" or acceptable only to inferior men.1
57
Despite its limiting structure, the Complex Phrase has been misused by tradi-
tional jurists to build an edifice of patriarchal oppression within the family.158 This
structure has destroyed for many women all tranquillity and imposed upon them
obedience and loss of basic liberties of such a nature and to such an extent as to
make them wards, virtual slaves and prisoners in their own homes and mar-
riages. 59 Traditional jurisprudence ignored totally the limitation aspect of the
phrase and instead generalized it as a right and a distinction belonging to all men,
even in cases where God clearly favored some women over some men with brains,
skills, wealth and other gifts.160
This analysis sheds new light on the traditional insistence that the husband must
maintain the wife (so that any condition in the marriage contract to the contrary
would be void). It reveals that a husband who does not maintain his wife would
lack one of the two prerequisites necessary for qiwamah (regardless of the mean-
ing of that word), and hence would not be qnwwam.' 6' The traditional prohibition
against women entering the workforce can also be viewed in the same light. It
perpetuates their financial dependence on men.
In other words, the traditional approach of jurists towards the issue of qhamah
of men was two-pronged. One prong was based on the argument that God had fa-
vored all men over all women by endowing them with more brains and brawn.
This sexist argument allowed the jurists to view the first part of the two conditions
155. See supra notes 98-100, 107-110 and related text.
156. See SAYiDATY MAGAZINE, June 29-July 5, 1996, at 90-92 (reporting this incident).
157. Id
158. BENNAN, supra note 125, at 14-17 (pointing out that the basis of that edifice was
the division of labor within the family). The division of labor was in turn justified by the
Stereotype.
159. See, e.g., AL-BARDISL, supra note 70, at 327-37. See also, 8 IaN QUDANAH, supra
note 65, at 129.
160. See, e.g., 5 ABu SHUQQAH, supra note 7, at 100; supra notes 129-130 and related
text. See also the discussion by 2 RmHA, supra note 112, at 380 (arguing that men are
more deserving of the position of "head of the family" than women, because men are better
at recognizing the interest of the family, and more capable of pursuing such interest with
their influence and money); BENNAN, supra note 125, at 12-42 (debunking these claims as
inconsistent with the Qur'an).
161. For the significance of this point, see the discussion of I AL-Kt,.LISH, supra note
67, at 231-32.
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in the Complex Phrase as automatically satisfied.162 The other prong sought to se-
cure the woman's financial dependence. So, jurists confined the woman to her
home, thus banning her from public life and from any real possibility of providing
for herself (unless she was already independently wealthy). All this was done de-
spite the fact that all jurists recognized that Islam preserved for the woman her fi-
nancial independence and that early Muslim women were business leaders in their
society.
163
Traditional jurists not only espoused the patriarchal model, but they actively
worked at making it a universal reality by passing restrictive laws which were
highly detrimental to women. They utilized the Stereotype and their legal power
to assert the automatic qiwamah of all men.'6 This unjust approach defeated the
limiting purpose of the Complex Phrase. Their interpretation of the Complex
Phrase was based on a patriarchally-biased interpretation of that ayah, an oppres-
sive behavior toward women and the supplementation of Qur'anic law with a
stereotype which harbored a deep contradiction with the Qur'anic Equality Prin-
ciple as stated in several ayahs. Consequently, thoughtful Muslims should no
longer accept that interpretation; and Muslim women must rediscover the truth of
the Qur'anic Equality Principle in order to achieve liberation and freedom without
guilt.
To be able to reach this challenging goal, Muslim women must formulate a
strategy for change. In this strategy, the dramatic increase in the number of
women seeking legal and religious education must rank very high. Therefore, we
turn now to an assessment of such a demand from an Islamic point of view.
III. THE RIGHT TO EQUAL EDUCATION
INTRODUCTION
The Platform for Action, adopted by the Fourth World Conference on Women,
162. See, e.g., 2 MUHAMMAD AKLAH, NriHAM AL-UsRAH Fi AL-ISLAM (3 vols.) 17-20
(Amman Maktabat al-Risalah al-Hadithah, 1983); GHANDOUR, supra note 65, at 235; AL-
BARDIsI, supra note 70, at 327 See also supra notes 129-130 and related text.
163. MAHMASSANI, supra note 16, at 495; ABD AL-HAMID, supra note 130, at 127.
164. BENNANI, supra note 125, at 25 (alluding to this point when she wonders whether
present gender differences were not artificially produced by patriarchal manipulation of the
rules and laws of society and the family). See FATIMAH NASIF, HUQUQ QL-MAR'AH WA
WAJIBATUHA Fi DAW' AL-KITAB WA AL-SuNNAH 238-40 (Jeddah, Tahamah, 1992) where the
Saudi author argues that the husband is entitled to head his family by virtue of the natural
capabilities that God endowed all men with. Among her reasons for giving men the leader-
ship status are the following two: each organizational structure must have a head, and the
husband is better suited to be that head, because of his physical strength and his role as
maintainer and protector.
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September 15, 1995, contains a special section on education and the training of
women in the chapter entitled "Strategic Objectives and Actions."' 65 The section
declares that "[e]ducation is a human right." It also lists several specific strategic
objectives, which include the following: (1) ensuring equal access to education, (2)
eradicating illiteracy among women, and (3) improving women's access to voca-
tional training, science and technology, and continuing education.10
A report prepared by UNICEF notes that "the Arab World has recently wit-
nessed a substantial decrease in the educational gender gap." 167 It also states that
"the most dramatic improvements in [the primary level of] female education have
been achieved in Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain..." and that "the gender gap has
completely been closed in the U.A.E."'6' All the countries named consist of tradi-
tional Islamic societies which follow Islamic law. It would thus appear that the
Platform strategic objectives on the education of women and those of Islamic so-
cieties are mutually consistent.
The report, however, points out that a gender gap does exist in Arab countries
at higher levels of education due to variety of reasons, including poverty, political
unrest and patriarchal attitudes. Some of these attitudes appear to be influenced by
traditional religious justifications which require women to be confined to the home
and the segregation of the sexes.169 They also appear to be a rejection of Western
secular education in Muslim countries and the morality it engenders.170
Recently, the French paper Le Monde reported that since a certain Islamic
group of fighters in Afghanistan has taken a city, women there no longer had the
right to work or attend school. In defense of the new policy, the following expla-
nation was provided by the group: "We want to set up a government based on the
precepts of the holy Koran and the Prophet's recommendations."' Whether the
report is accurate or not, it is a fact that some Muslim male jurists have argued in
the past that women should not be accorded the same education as men.'7 Their
views continue to influence the decisions of some Muslim families, especially in
case of scarce resources. Consequently, the article will discuss the Muslim
woman's right to education.
165. UNI-ED NATIONS, PLATFORM FOR AcTION AND THE BEIJING DEucARAiON 46-56
(1996).
166. Ia
167. RAEDA AL-ZOuBm, ENDING GENDER DispAms IN Tm ARAB Vonw 16 (UNICEF
1995).
168. Id at 17.
169. See supra notes 84-85 ; infra notes 210-211 and accompanying text.
170. Note for example the recent Kuwaiti decision to segregate higher education. Those
who opposed the decision were branded as secularists and Western lackeys. See, e.g., Edi-
torial, AL-MArrAMA, June 25-July 1,1996, at 9.
171. LEMONDE, Oct. 29, 1995, at20.
172. For more on this, see infra notes 207-209 and accompanying text.
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THE ISLAMIC POSITION ON EDUCATION
Prophet Muhammad was illiterate. The first divine word revealed to him was
the imperative: "Read."173 The rest of the Qur'an is replete with verses that em-
phasize the importance of the pursuit of knowledge. For example, the Qur'an ex-
horts Muslims to ask God to increase their knowledge. 74 It underscores the im-
portance of knowledge: "God elevates by several degrees the ranks of those of you
who believe and those who have knowledge."' 75 The Qur'an even asks rhetori-
cally in one 6assage, "Say, are those two equal: those who know and those who do
not know?" 6
The Prophet himself emphasized the importance of knowledge and education.
Among his most famous statements on the subject are the following: "Scholars are
the heirs of prophets"; ' "all that is in heaven and earth asks God's forgiveness for
. 178 .,,,179
a scholar";'78 "pursuit of knowledge is the duty of every Muslim " and "pursue
knowledge even if you have to go as far as China."' 80
Many Muslim jurists viewed education as either completely or practically com-
pulsory, based on an ayah that states: "[T]hose who conceal [from people] the
clear Signs which we revealed and the Guidance, after we have made it clear to
people in the Book [the Qur'an], shall be cursed by God and others who [are enti-
tled to] curse."""1
173. The first part of the surah says in full: "Read in the name of God who Created;
Created the human being from a [mere] clinging clot. Read and God is the most noble, who





177. 1 AL-BUKHARi, supra note 10, at 23. 1 MUHAMMAD IBN MAJAH, SUNAN IBN MAJAH
81 (9th Century, reprint, Muhammad Abd al-Baqi ed., Cairo n.d.).
178. 1 IBN MAJAH, supra note 177, at 8 1.
179. Id.; MUHAMMAD AL-IBRASHI, AL-TARBIYAH AL-ISLAMIYAH WA-FALSAFATUHA 53
(3d ed., Cairo, Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi Press 1975). The latter reference confirms the
traditional understanding of the generic word "Muslim" in the hadith as referring to both
males and females.
180. 1 MUHAMMAD NAsIR AL-DIN AL-ALBANI, SILSILAT AL-AHADITH AL-DA'IFAH WA AL-
MAWDU'AH 413 et seq. (expanded 4th ed., Beirut, al-Maktab al-Islami, 1977). This hadith
is viewed by major scholars as weak, i.e., its attribution to the Prophet has not been satisfac-
torily established. It is, nevertheless, important to include here, if only because of the
popularity of this hadith among the Muslim masses. Indeed, it is the first hadith that Mus-
lims are likely to quote on the subject. Thus, the impact of this hadith, despite its weakness,
has been quite significant on the consciousness of Muslims throughout the Ages. This fact
makes it specially deserving of mention in this paragraph, especially because it is consistent
with the Qur'an and the authenticated hadith.
181. QUR'AN 2:159. Many modem scholars have discussed this topic and concluded
that education in Islam is compulsory. See, e.g., I 'ABD ALLAH 'ALWAN, TARBIYAT AL-
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Imam aI-Shafi'i, an important fourteenth century jurist, went so far as to argue
that if the inhabitants of a province of a Muslim state unanimously agree to aban-
don learning, it is the duty of the ruler to force them to pursue it.18 Al-Qabisi, a
prominent tenth century jurist, noted that, if parents are financially unable to edu-
cate their children, the community must pay to educate them instead.l18
There was more significant disagreement among Muslim jurists, however, on
what scope of knowledge was required of or desirable for Muslims. Some wanted
to limit the type and scope of knowledge to those prevalent during the time of the
Prophet and his Companions.184 Others found this rigid view unacceptable. For
example, Abu Hanifah, a major figure in Islamic jurisprudence whose views on
family law were examined in Part II, argued that a Muslim must receive a broad
education.18 He noted that unless Muslims studied the main currents of thought in
their historical epoch, they will be unable to properly distinguish truth from false-
hood. For, Abu Hanifah argues, the basis for such distinction can only be knowl-
edge and not ignorance. 'When criticized for advocating the learning of matters not
attended to by the Companions of the Prophet, Abu Hanifah noted that the Com-
panions lived in a different time and a different society. 19
Ibn Taymiyah, another prominent 13th century scholar, also denounced narrow-
mindedness and advocated openness towards learning the views of non-Muslims
as well as those of other Muslims. This was especially true, he argued, in fields
such as medicine and mathematics which serve the interests of the Muslim com-
munity. He defended his position by recounting a statement by the Khalifah Omar
who said that Islam would be gradually undone, if a [generation of] Muslims grew
up ignorant ofjahiliyah (The Age of Ignorance which preceded Islam).'U
AI-Ghazali, a major scholar of the eleventh century, divided knowledge into
two categories: fardh ayn and fardh kifayah 183 The first category contained the
kinds of knowledge that every Muslim must acquire. A1-Ghazali noted that Mus-
lims disagreed on what to include in this category. Some wanted to include only
knowledge of the Qur'an and sunnah. Others wanted to include Islamic jurispru-
dence as well. Still others wanted to include other topics that they judged impor-
AWLAD Fi AL-IsLAM (2 vols.) 262 (expanded 6th ed., Beirut, Dar al-Salam, 1983); AL-
IBRAsHI, supra note 179, 53-59 (arguing that education of the public is practically compul-
sory in Islam); MAim AL-KLANI, TATAWWUR IMAPIH AL-NAZARIYAH AL-TARBA\YIYAH
AL-IsL MiYAH 64, 93 (expanded 2d ed., Beirut, Dar Ibn Kathir, 1985). For an overview of
the Islamic position on education and learning see generally AHiAD BIN SRU'AYB AL-
NASA', KrrAB AL-'iui (9th Century, reprint, Virginia, International Institute of Islamic
Thought 1993).
182. AL-KLANI supra note 181, at 93 (quoting al-Bayhaqi on the matter).
183. AiAD AL-AmvANI, AL-TARBYAH F AL-IsLAm 101 (Cairo, Dar al-Ma'aref,
1980).
184. AL-KLANI supra note 181, at 88.
185. Id at 89.
186. Id at 88.
187. Id at205.
188. 1 AL-GHAZAL!, supra note 14, at20-21.
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tant. His solution was flexible. AI-Ghazali included in the first category (fardh
ayn) whatever knowledge Muslims need to properly discharge all their duties in
the particular society in which they live and in light of their own relevant circum-
stances. 18 9 Knowledge in the category offardh kifayah is that which a community
needs for its well-being, but such that the need can be satisfied by some (but not
necessarily) all of the members acquiring it. Examples of such knowledge include
medicine, agriculture and engineering.
The relativization of compulsory knowledge to one's social and individual
context is eminently reasonable. But unfortunately, like all reasonable arguments,
this argument becomes full of pitfalls when combined with patriarchal assump-
tions. As we shall see later, a variant of this logic was used by al-Qabisi and others
to deny women full education.
EDUCATING MUSLIM WOMEN
1. The Status of Muslim Women.
The Islamic position on the education of women is derived from both the Is-
lamic view of women and that of education. As mentioned earlier, the Qur'an
states that all humans were created from one nafs and that God made from that
nafs her mate so that he (the mate) may find tranquillity with her °1 ' The Qur'an
adds that God put love and mercy between the two mates.' 9'
Absent from the Qur'an is the view that God created Eve from Adam's rib.192
Also absent is the notion that Adam's fall to earth was caused by Eve and the pur-
suit of (carnal) knowledge. Rather, the Qur'an tells us, the fall of Adam and Eve
occurred when they both succumbed to Satan's offer of immortality, and diso-
beyed God in its pursuit.
93
Furthermore, in Islam men and women have similar religious duties and obli-
gations. This fact is emphasized by the Qur'an in content as well as in form. As to
content, the ayah mentioned in Part II says it all: "male believers and female be-
lievers, some of them are the wali's (moral guides, supporters, protectors) of oth-
ers". 94 As to form, the Qur'an specifically uses on numerous occasions female as
well as male-gendered words in addressing women and men simultaneously. From
a linguistic point of view, such dual address is unnecessary since the Arabic lan-
guage, like the English language, permits the use of the male pronoun in address-
189. Id. at 21-22.
190. QUR'AN 30:21.
191. Id.
192. Such statements do appear, however, in Islamic literature, including hadith. This
literature must be critically reviewed in light of Qur'anic statements as well as the general
spirit of the Qur'an. So far, patriarchal schools of thought have tended to accept it uncriti-
cally. See, e.g., I A13U SHUQQAH, supra note 7, at 288-90.
193. QUR'AN 20:117-121.
194. Id. 9: 71.
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ing both genders collectively. So, why did the Qur'an use this dual form of ad-
dress?
According to commentators, the dual form of address in the Qur'an followed a
discussion between Muslim women and the Prophet.195 The women complained
that Qur'anic ayahs (up to that point) appeared to address men only, while Muslim
women were performing religious and other duties similar to those of men. Of
course the women were not oblivious to the patriarchal linguistic convention.
Many of these women were accomplished poets. Instead, they were making a
feminist critique of language, similar to that made by the feminist movement in the
United States over fourteen hundred years later. God responded to that critique
positively and immediately. Hence the dual form of address.
An incident which further illustrates the equal and active status of women in
Islam is mentioned in the Qur'an. When the Prophet was selected to lead the
Muslims, women participated in that selection. They came to the Prophet as a
delegation of the women of Arabia and extended to him their bay'ah (vote of con-
fidence). The Qur'an refers to this event as well as to the words of the Prophet on
that occasion.196 Thus, the event is eternally recorded by divine revelation as evi-
dence of the Muslim woman's right to participate in the electoral process.
Even more surprising is another incident in the Qur'an which is recounted in
the surah entitled "The Woman Who Argued". 97 Generally, translators tend to
translate the title inaccurately as "The Woman Who Pleaded". In fact, the con-
cerned woman did argue with the Prophet. She had come to him with a complaint
against her husband. The Prophet's answer to her complaint did not satisfy her
because it was not responsive to her needs. She therefore asked him to ask for
God's revelation instead. After some insistence on her part, a revelation came to
the Prophet. It was sympathetic to her plight, and the woman was thankful. So
should be the Muslim women of today for whom this incident provides direct
Qur'anic evidence of their standing to participate in religious dialogue even with
the Prophet.
In the exciting atmosphere of building a new and equitable society, A'isha, the
wife of the Prophet, became a major religious figure. After the death of the
Prophet, she became a major source of hadith. She also became involved in the
political life of the community and, on one occasion, led a group of Muslims into
battle over the issue of political succession. There were also hundreds of women
who were among the Companions of the Prophet. These women exhibited a real
interest in the pursuit of an education.
History makes clear that, the religious education of women in early Islam pro-
ceeded hand in hand with that of the men. Consequently, women would enter into
debates with men about the proper interpretation of a certain verse in the Qur'an,
or of a hadith, or the significance of a certain event. A famous incident took place
195. 10 AL-TABARP, supra note 63, at 299-300.
196. QUR'AN 60:12.
197. Id 58 (improperly translated by Ali as "The Woman Who Pleaded").
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in the mosque between the Khalifah (Caliph) Omar and an unknown woman.
The Khalifah wanted to place an upper limit on the amount of mahr a woman
may demand from a man. But mahr was not intended as consideration for the
woman's entry into a monogamous sexual relation with a man, but rather to pro-
vide the woman with a precautionary safety net which she may decide to exploit
during the life of the marriage or later, either by investing it or by using it to start
her own business. 98 That money is to be her personal property, one to which the
husband may have no access even if he were in need. Thus, the importance of this
safety net can not be over-emphasized. By arguing for placing a ceiling on the
amount of the mahr, in order to facilitate the marriage of young men, the Khalifah
was taking away from women their right to determine the size of the safety net that
makes them comfortable. A woman understood the significance of this proposal
and stood up in the mosque taking issue with the Khalifah. She said: "you shall
not take away from us what God has given us." She then cited a passage from the
Qur'an which supported her argument. The Khalifah realized his error, saying: "A
woman is right and the Khalifah is wrong."' 99
This story is remarkable not only because it is an illustration of the participation
of women in the religious activity of interpretation (itihad), but also because it re-
veals the degree of democracy in the early days of the Islamic state. The woman
was unknown, but through her Qur'anic knowledge, she successfully made the
Khalifah withdraw his proposal.
The literature abounds with stories of women who dialogued with men about
proper Islamic practices, or the preferred interpretation of an Islamic text.20
Women also were major reporters of hadith.201 As a result, many prominent men
202
came to them for religious education and guidance. This trend continued for
several centuries after the death of the Prophet. As the concept of education ex-
panded, many women leaders appeared in the various disciplines. There were
prominent female literary figures, religious leaders, doctors, judges, politicians,
and teachers to name a few.
It might be useful at this point to mention some of these women. Among the
outstanding literary figures are Sukaynah bint al-Hussayn, the granddaughter of
the Prophet, A'isha bint Talha and Walladah Bint al-Mustakfi. Among the physi-
cians are Zainab, the physician of the tribe of bani Awd and Um al-Hassan,
daughter of Judge Abu Ja'far al-Tanjali. Among those who actively participated in
198. JAMAL NASHR, TiH STATUS OF WOMEN UNDER ISLAMIC LAW AND UNDER MODERN
ISLAMIC LEGISLATION 43 (Boston, Graham & Trotman 1990) (arguing that mahr is neither a
bride-price nor consideration for the marriage and quoting codes which stress this view).
GHANDOuR, supra note 65, at 188-89 (arguing that mahr is solely the woman's property).
199. 1 AL-GHAZALI, supra note 14, at 50.
200. Ahmad Shalabi, Al-Tarbiyah wa al-Ta'lim, in 5 MAWSU'AT AL-HADARAH AL-
ISLAMiYAH 342-44 (Exp. 8th ed., Cairo, Maktabat al-Nahdhah al-Nabawiyah, 1987).
201. Id. at 343-44. See also 12 MUHAMMAD AL-SAKHAWI, AL-DAW' AL-LAMi' (12 vols.)
passim (15th Century, reprint, Beirut, Dar Maktabat al-Hayat, n.d.).
202. SHALABI, supra note 200, at 343-44; 12 AL-SAKHAWi, supra note 201,passim.
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politics are Hind bint Yazid al-Ansariyah and 'Akrashah bint al-Utroush. Among
the heads of state were Shajarat al-Durr of Egypt and Queen Arva of Yemen.
There are of course many other accomplished Muslim women in many diverse
fields. Some of them have been mentioned in books but remained nameless.!03
Furthermore, many great male Islamic scholars were taught by great female Is-
lamic scholars. However, unfortunately the latter's contributions were not as
quickly recognized by their contemporaries or as meticulously preserved by male
historians. Among the male scholars who studied under female scholars are al-
Shafi'i, Ibn Khillikan and Abu Hayyan. z ' Ibn 'Asaker, a prominent hadith
scholar, mentioned that his female mentors and teachers numbered more than
eighty.205 Today, Muslim women are conducting research to rediscover and ex-
pand their knowledge of these once prominent Muslim female scholars.
2. On Education
There is general agreement among Muslim scholars that educating women is a
duty, not just an option or a luxury. This view is based upon the Qur'anic state-
ments on education mentioned above as well as the clear words of the Prophet who
stated that education is a duty (fardh) upon all Muslims (whether male or fe-
male).205 It is also a consequence of the equality in religious duties and obligations
incumbent upon male and female. Since understanding one's religion isfardh ayn,
as al-Ghazali put it, Muslim women, just like men, must have full access to relig-
ious education.
Historically, the clarity of the Islamic position on the education of women
served only to shift the debate from whether women have a right to an education to
the scope and mode of a woman's rightful education. One group argued that
women have the right for a full education, including higher education!"u? Others,
such as al-Qabisi were not so sure. AI-Qabisi agreed that education is generally
good for women, but he also wanted women to be taught only those subjects
which were good and beneficial to them. He advised the females' guardians that
they had a duty to steer their daughters away from subjects which may lead them
"to what we fear".
208
The issue discussed above reveals precisely the juncture at which patriarchal
views of a hierarchical societal order, and the role and status of women therein,
intersect. It also reveals how patriarchy presents its highly damaging conclusions
203. AL-IBRASH, supra note 179, at 127-31. For a good work on Muslim women, see
KAHALAH, supra note 7.
204. AL-IBRAsHI, supra note 179, at 131.
205. Id at 126.
206. 1 AL-GHAZALt, supra note 14, at 15; 2 ABu SHUQQAH, supra note 7, at 41; AbaNAH
AHMAD HASAN, NATIYAT AL-TARBYAH F AL-QuR'AN WA TATBIQATHA F! 'AiD AL-
RASUL 'ALAYm AL-SALAT WA AL-SALAM 188 (Cairo, Dar al-Ma'aref, 1985); AL-KnAN4I,
supra note 181, at 64.
207. AL-IBRASHI, supra note 179, at 127, 131.
208. AL-AHWAN supra note 183, at 289.
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in the guise of a standard application of neutral jurisprudential principles. In this
instance, al-Qabisi argued that it would be "safer" not to teach girls how to write,
and advocated that their curriculum be free of poetry, literature and writing.0 9
This position is sadly ironic in light of the fact that some of the most famous poets
in early Islam were women.
The argument to restrict the female's education offered by al-Qabisi and many
others, however, became popular with some Muslim fathers. Given these fathers'
patriarchal attitudes, the argument provided them with a satisfactory reconciliation
between their duty (discussed earlier) to educate their children, whether male or
female, and their patriarchal cultural bias. The proposal to restrict the female's
education was especially attractive because it created, during a period of en-
trenched patriarchy, the illusion of discharging the fathers' religious responsibili-
ties towards their daughters. The woman's voice, as citizen and daughter, was ef-
fectively muted during this debate.
AI-Qabisi's view, however, must be placed within the context of the totality of
his views on education. For example, he also listed poetry (non-romantic), arith-
metic and grammar as a merely optional part of the boys' curriculum, but again, at
the option of the parents. This fact illustrates how far al-Qabisi had strayed from
the tradition of education in the Arabian Peninsula whose backbone was poetry,
the social glue of the community.
Furthermore, al-Qabisi argued that young girls may be educated so long as they
did not attend classes with older boys. Others went further, arguing that while
women were entitled to an education, they should be educated at home.210 In both
cases, the arguments superimposed patriarchal cultural values on traditional juris-
prudential principles. Two of the jurisprudential principles involved in advocating
the separation of sexes in the classroom were those of barring pretexts and promot-
ing public interest.211 The latter principle is usually implied in arguments which
call for the protection of the morality of Muslim women or, alternatively, for the
protection of the morality of Muslim men from thefitnah (temptation, seduction)
of women.
Therefore, looking at these arguments from a woman's perspective, the debate
among the various groups of men is not really about the proper education of
women in Islam. Rather, it is about a cultural debate on the status and role of
women (their circumstances and function) in society.
IV. CONCLUSION
Patriarchal reasoning and culture has influenced Islamic jurisprudence for cen-
209. Id.
210. AL-ANwANI, supra note 183, at 105; AL-IBRASFH, supra note 179, at 131.
211. ABu ZAHRAM, UsuL AL-FIQH 268-76, 341-43 (Cairo, Dar al-Fikr al-'Arabi, n.d.); 2
AL-ZuHAYLi, supra note 9, at 873-74.
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turies. That state of affairs is not surprising given that the interpreters were, like
every one else, the products of their milieu. Furthermore, the fact that jtihad was
permitted to adjust to the needs of the society in which it was conducted injected
that Utihad with desirable features, such as flexibility and diversity, but simultane-
ously opened it to patriarchal influences.
Given the basic jurisprudential principle that laws change with the change of
time and place, it is now time to review that jurisprudence in light of less patriar-
chal conditions. For example, it should be possible today to develop a jurispru-
dence which takes into account the fact that the patriarchal Stereotype of women is
false and that the international community has made a commitment to women's
rights. The new jurisprudence should therefore reexamine all traditional jurispru-
dence in light of these developments and purge it from all patriarchal cultural bi-
ases that are foreign to our lives today. The result would be truer to the Qur'anic
Principle of Equality.
This argument is being made from the point of view of an American Muslim
woman. A non-American Muslim woman may point out that her culture is still
heavily patriarchal, regardless of any international pressures. This is true. How-
ever, for Muslims, it is God and not the international community which gave
women their rights, and a good Muslim must strive to achieve the ideals of Islam
which include the Principle of Equality. Muslim women can advance this point of
view through a critique ofjurisprudence similar to the one undertaken in this arti-
cle. Their work will reshape the discussion in many of these countries by showing
that Islam does not require, in fact is diametrically opposed to, the oppressive laws
adopted there. This fact places gender issues on a new plain. Religion will no
longer be accepted for justifying oppressive arguments. The real basis of such ar-
guments, namely patriarchal culture will be exposed. In a land where religion is of
primary importance, separating Islam from the web of patriarchal cultures is a big
step forward.
It is important to note that some Muslim women are already busy writing on
these issues in these countries.2! 12 Very often, however, the expressed views are
timid because of the nature of the situation. American Muslim women have the
advantage of addressing matters more aggressively because they are not as much
at risk as their non-American sisters are for expressing these views. Non-Muslim
Western women could also help in this delicate equation by respecting this Muslim
feminist approach and resisting the temptation to label Islam itself as patriarchal,
an act that can only make the feminist project suspect in Islamic societies.
Finally, it should be crystal clear at this point that no real progress in human
rights is achievable without true democracy. Indeed, it ought to be an important
part of our American feminist project to hold our government accountable for its
support of dictatorial regimes in Muslim countries. It is often argued that such
support in necessary to protect American interests. Samuel Huntington not with-
212. See Azizah al-Hibri, A Survey of Womanist Islamic Thought, in THE BLACr.WE.L
COMPANON TO F lmsTP m.osopvy (forthcoming 1997).
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standing, the true interest of the American people lies in long term friendships with
the rest of the people of the world. 3
213. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, The Clash of Civilization, FOREIGN AFF. 22-49 (Summer
1993).
